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COMMON LAW COURTS IN AN AGE OF
EQUITY PROCEDURE: REDEFINING
APPELLATE REVIEW FOR THE MASS
TORT ERA
MELISSA

A. WATERS*

From expansion of tort liability rules, to novel claims aggregation
and settlement techniques, to statistically derived liability and
damages assessments, mass tort litigation is producing

unprecedented innovations at every level of the federal legal
system. What is particularly striking about these innovations is
that they are almost exclusively the product of a handful offederal
trial judges who specialize in mass tort cases. Because appellate
courts lack the necessary tools to supervise their decisions, these
few mass tort trial judges are shaping the rules that govern the
mass tort legal regime with little or no appellate supervision. The
result is a dramaticimbalance ofpower between trial and appellate

courts, one that hinders the proper development of the mass tort
regime. This Article explores the historical reasons for this
phenomenon, as well as its consequences for mass tort litigation.
It argues that federal trial and appellate procedure have become
increasingly uncoupled, with appellate courts relying on a
common law-based procedural model while trial courts have
adopted a much more flexible equity-based model The Article

examines the gradualevolution of appellate review in response to
this phenomenon, as some appellate courts begin to shift from a
common law-based model of appellate procedure to an equitybased model that recognizes the need for flexible interlocutory
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, Spring 2002. I am grateful to the Honorable Morris S. Arnold, E. Donald Elliott,
David M. Farnum, Harold Hongju Koh, the Honorable Richard A. Posner, and the
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein for providing comments on this Article or other support.
The title of this Article is adapted, with permission, from the Honorable Guido Calabresi's
book, "A Common Law for the Age of Statutes," a work that greatly influenced my
thinking about the proper role of appellate courts. I am particularly indebted to Peter H.
Schuck, my principal advisor on this project, for his incisive comments, unstinting
encouragement, and endless patience. This Article is dedicated to my father, the
Honorable H. Franklin Waters, Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas, who over the course of twenty years of dedicated service to the
federal bench, has displayed that rare combination of a brilliant legal mind, great wit, and
quiet compassion that makes a truly great trial judge.
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review in mass tort cases. It argues that further development of an
equity-based model is essential to ensure a strong appellate voice
in shaping the mass tort regime. In addition, the Article offers
strategiesfor encouragingthe continued development of an equitybased model, as well as guiding principles in choosing appellate
review mechanisms for mass tort litigation. It concludes that a
deliberate and systematic approach to interlocutory review,
utilizing the writ of mandamus, can restore the proper balance of
power between trial and appellate courts and ensure a strong
appellate voice in the development of the mass tort regime.
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From the asbestos and breast implant cases of earlier decades, to
today's tobacco and Fen-Phen litigation, to nascent class actions
against the manufacturers of cell phones and genetically modified
food, mass tort litigation is producing unprecedented innovations at
every level of our legal system. Few legal subdisciplines have
remained immune from this urge to innovate. From expansion of tort
liability rules, to novel claims aggregation and settlement techniques,
to statistically derived liability and damages assessments, the mass
tort regime is producing what Professor Peter Schuck calls "some of
the most far-reaching innovations in judicial history."' These
1. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80
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innovations have dramatically altered the legal landscape not just for
mass tort cases, but increasingly for other complex cases as well.
What is particularly striking about these innovations is that they
are almost exclusively the product of a handful of so-called "mass tort
trial judges": federal trial judges who have become specialists and
repeat players in the mass tort arena, their own caseloads mirroring
the changes in the mass tort landscape.' Working in unusually close
concert with one another and with an equally small number of mass
tort scholars, the work of mass tort trial judges "constitute[s] a firm,
self-conscious judicial commitment to the project of systematizing and
refining mass tort litigation into a distinctive genre with its own rules
and practices." 3
Yet for the most part, mass tort trial judges are creating,
systematizing, and refining the genre alone, without the guidance of
appellate courts. In shaping the new rules that govern the mass tort
regime, these trial judges rely heavily on the flexible equity practice
that has long dominated federal trial procedure-one that encourages
disposition of claims (and thus the creation of new, controversial
devices for handling those claims) through pretrial rulings and
settlement rather than trial. But in attempting to review these
innovations, appellate courts are still constrained by the inflexible
rules of traditional common law practice, which discourages appellate
involvement in the pretrial process in favor of post-trial review upon
final judgment. Because mass tort litigation almost exclusively
emphasizes pretrial maneuvering and settlement, appellate courts
CORNELL L. REV. 941, 956 (1995). "These innovations include novel claims aggregation

techniques, statistically-derived outcomes, administration of discovery, damages
assessments, advanced courtroom technologies, more systematic alternative dispute
resolution efforts, and coordinated federal-state court proceedings." Id at 956-57. See
generallyJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) (discussing innovations in civil procedure, including the
controversial settlement class action).
2. See infra Part II.B (discussing the rise of the "mass tort trial judge"). While this
Article focuses on innovations at the federal level, interesting changes are occurring in
both trial and appellate procedure at the state court level as well, partly in response to
mass tort litigation. See, e.g., Fred Misko, Jr. & Frank E. Goodrich, Managing Complex
Litigation: Class Actions and Mass Torts, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 1001, 1068-72 (1996)
(discussing a Texas Supreme Court ruling potentially signaling relaxed rules regarding
mandamus in the mass tort context); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity ConqueredCommon
Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
909, 991 & n.471 (1990) (discussing state courts experimenting with case tracking for
different case types); David Scheffel, Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in New YorkTime Has Come For a More Efficient Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 607, 638-45 (1996)
(proposing changes to the New York rules regarding interlocutory appeals).
3. Schuck, supra note 1, at 958.
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never effectively review many of the most controversial rulings and
innovations of mass tort trial judges. The consequences of this
phenomenon, which I refer to as "procedural uncoupling, '4 are
twofold.
First, the mass tort regime has experienced an
unprecedented reallocation of power in favor of mass tort trial judges.
Second, appellate courts lack the necessary tools to exercise their
proper role in supervising the development of the mass tort regime.
Part I of this Article explores the historical reasons for the
modem disconnect between mass tort trial judges and appellate
courts.5 It discusses how and why trial and appellate procedure
became uncoupled in the federal system, with appellate courts
continuing to follow the common law model while trial courts
adopted a much more flexible equity-based model. Part II examines
the special relevance of procedural uncoupling in the mass tort
context, and discusses one of its major consequences on the mass tort
regime: the dramatic reallocation of power to mass tort trial judges.6
Part III examines the evolution of appellate review of mass tort
litigation in response to this phenomenon, and identifies three distinct
generational stages in that evolution. It argues that the increased
willingness of appellate courts to grant interlocutory review in mass
tort cases reveals a gradual shift from a first-generation common lawbased model of appellate procedure to a third-generation equitybased model. Additionally, Part III argues that further development
of an equity-based model is essential to ensuring a strong appellate
voice in shaping the substantive and procedural law that defines the
mass tort regime as a whole. Part IV suggests ways to encourage the
further development of an equity-based model.8 It enumerates
certain guiding principles in choosing appellate review mechanisms
for mass tort litigation, and examines recent initiatives for reform of
appellate review in light of these principles.

4. Professor Stephen Yeazell first noted the phenomenon of "procedural
uncoupling" in his 1994 article, The MisunderstoodConsequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 641 (stating that trial and appellate procedure have become
"uncoupled").
5. See infra notes 9-46 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 47-107 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 108-268 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 269-323 and accompanying text.

532

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

I. TAKING COMMON LAW APPEALS FROM EQUITABLE DECISIONS:
THE MODERN UNCOUPLING OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE
PROCEDURE

The modem power imbalance between mass tort trial judges and
appellate courts has its roots in a striking historical phenomenon that,
although it has received scant attention from legal scholars, has had a
dramatic impact on modem civil process. Throughout the twentieth
century, trial and appellate procedure in the federal system have
evolved along two divergent paths: Procedural law at the trial level
increasingly draws upon the flexibility and expansiveness of the
equity model, while at the appellate level the law clings to a relatively
strict, inflexible common law model. In this Part, I trace this
phenomenon, first noted by Professor Stephen Yeazell, which I shall
refer to as "procedural uncoupling."9 While Professor Yeazell
described procedural uncoupling as dating from the creation of the
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1" I posit a more expansive
view of procedural uncoupling, tracing its origins to the Judiciary Act
of 1789 that established the federal court system."
The RelationshipBetween Trial and Appellate Procedurein the
Early American Legal System
Until the twentieth century, trial and appellate procedure in
Anglo-American jurisprudence worked in tandem to ensure a
reasonably efficient allocation of resources and a rough balance of
power between trial and appellate courts. 2 By the early sixteenth
century, for example, the English common law and equity courts had
developed two distinct approaches to appellate review, in keeping
with their distinct procedural systems and jurisprudence. 3 The
English common law courts handled relatively simple cases derived
from a limited number of writs.' 4 Appeal from a common law cause
A.

9. See Yeazell, supra note 4, at 641 (stating that trial and appellate procedure have
become "uncoupled").
10. See id. at 660-64 (discussing how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a
new set of important pretrial rulings that were effectively unreviewable by appellate courts
still applying the common law final judgment rule).
11. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
12. See, e.g., Yeazell, supra note 4, at 642 (describing the "reciprocal relationship
between trial and appellate courts"); id. at 644 (noting that the nineteenth century's
"symbiotic relation between trial court process and appellate review was a powerful
force").
13. For a summary and comparison of English common law and equity procedure, see
Subrin, supra note 2, at 914-21.
14. See id. at 914-18.
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of action was available only upon entry of a final judgment-the so
called "final judgment rule."' 5 The historical common law rule made
no formal provision for interlocutory appellate review of trial court
decisions; interlocutory review was available only by extraordinary
writ, and only in very limited circumstances. 6 Because common law
causes of action were fairly simple, and most often characterized by a
single judicial decision produced at a single hearing before the lower

court, appellate courts could rely on the final judgment rule to
provide adequate supervisory authority over the lower courts.
By contrast, the equity branch of the English legal system, the
Court of Chancery, permitted virtually unlimited interlocutory
appellate review.

7

Because most of the cases in the Court of

Chancery involved complicated disputes unsuited to the simple
common law forms of action, equity jurisprudence developed a
number of flexible procedural devices and equitable remedies to
handle these complex cases. I8 Thus, the lower equity courts enjoyed

far greater power and latitude in decision-making than their common
law counterparts. Easier access to interlocutory appellate review
provided the necessary counterbalance to this increased flexibility at
the lower court level. In short, adherence to the common law's final

judgment rule would not have made sense in the equity context;
"equity had a more elastic procedure, and also required a less rigid
15. The source for the final judgment rule lay in common law writ of error practice.
The appellate court, King's Bench, corrected errors in the other common law courts only
by writ of error upon termination of the original suit. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 214 (7th ed. 1956); 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3906, at 266-67 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting McLish v.
Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891)); Carleton M. Crick, The FinalJudgment as a Basis for
Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539, 541-43 (1932).
The purposes behind the final judgment rule must be left largely to conjecture.
The original motives behind the rule may have been merely formalistic. See Crick, supra,
at 543-44. Professor Yeazell finds another possible justification for the existence of the
final judgment rule in "the divided jurisdictions that long marked the common law."
Yeazell, supra note 4, at 660 n.97. Yeazell argues that "[so] long as there were even
vestiges of local or feudal courts, a royal writ of error implicated not just a bureaucratic
but also a political line, one that it would be prudent to cross as infrequently as possible."
Id.
16. See Crick, supra note 15, at 553-57 (analyzing four extraordinary writs as means to
escape the application of the final judgment rule: mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and
habeas corpus).
17. See 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 15, at 438; Crick, supra note 15, at 547.
18. Equity courts utilized joinder devices, such as the "bill of peace" and "quasiconsolidation," and had the power to order pretrial discovery and to fashion equitable
remedies. These equitable devices did not exist in the common law courts. For a
discussion of various procedural devices used in historical equity practice and their
comparison to modem devices used in mass tort litigation, see infra Part II.A.
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practice on appeal to review the many and varied steps taken
below."19
From the outset, however, the American legal system abandoned

the sharp distinction between common law and equity that
characterized English appellate procedure. Instead, the United States
adopted a single common law model for appellate review of both
common law and equity cases. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress
decreed that all appeals, whether arising out of common law or
equity, could be taken from "final judgments" or "final decrees" only,
thus abandoning the flexible interlocutory appellate review that

characterized the equity model.2 °
Thus in the American system, trial and appellate procedure were
formally uncoupled from the outset. The effects of this uncoupling,
however, went largely unnoticed until well into the twentieth century.
19. Crick, supra note 15, at 548. In addition, Crick identifies a formalistic justification
for equity's policy of free resort to interlocutory review. He notes that in comparison to
appeals from common law courts, appeals to the House of Lords from the Court of
Chancery were established relatively late in legal history, during the latter half of the
seventeenth century. See id. at 547. For the first three centuries of equity practice, the
chancellor was considered the sole judge in chancery, and he passed on all decrees and
interlocutory orders issued by the masters. When the House of Lords asserted appellate
jurisdiction over chancery proceedings, it may simply have adopted the policy of free
resort to interlocutory review that already existed. See id. at 547-48.
20. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83-87 (1789). The United
States Congress's application of the final judgment rule to both common law and equity
cases was part of a larger trend in American civil procedure: As early as 1779, states
began to enact statutes applying the common law final judgment rule to cases arising out
of equity. See Crick, supra note 15, at 550.
The decision to limit equity appeals by applying the common law rule in all
proceedings was a strange departure from historical practice. Unfortunately, because of
the sparse legislative history regarding the appellate provisions of the Judiciary Act of
1789, the original motives behind this decision are uncertain. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 3906, at 264-68; Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finalityand Appealability
by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 717, 727 (1993);
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 49, 101-05 (1923).
One possible reason for the American departure from English practice is the
general failure of early American jurisdictions to maintain a distinction between law and
equity. At the lower court level, some states did establish separate equity courts; but
many others simply combined the two legal systems by permitting their common law
courts to hear equity cases or to grant equitable remedies. See Crick, supra note 15, at
550.
In addition, some commentators view the application of the final judgment rule to
equity cases as evidence of the early American distrust of equity practice in general. They
suggest that colonial Americans hoped to avoid the interminable delays that characterized
English chancery proceedings by eliminating opportunities for interlocutory review. See,
e.g., Subrin, supra note 2, at 926-28; Yeazell, supra note 4, at 660-61. But see 15A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 3906, at 264 n.4 (offering several other explanations for
the limitations on equity appeals).
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Throughout this early period, the common law final judgment rule
generally provided sufficient appellate supervision of trial courts for
two reasons. First, equity played a relatively unimportant role in the
21
early American legal system. Early Americans distrusted equity,
and their laws reflected a decided bias in favor of common law
jurisprudence and procedures.23 As a result of this bias, the first
several decades of federal jurisprudence were dominated by the
common law writ system, and by the fairly simple cases that writ
practice produced.3 In this context, the common law final judgment
rule operated reasonably efficiently as a supervisory mechanism,
ensuring a rough balance of power between trial and appellate
courts.24

Second, as the common law writ system began to disintegrate in
the nineteenth century, dramatic changes in trial procedure ensured
that the final judgment rule continued to be an effective supervisory
tool. As the writs decayed, a new body of procedural law (developed
largely by appellate courts) refocused attention and judicial resources
on the trial itself rather than on pleading or pretrial activities.O From
21. To early Americans, equity courts represented interminable delays, needless
expense, and, most importantly, unfettered judicial discretion. See LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 54-55 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing early

American distrust of equity courts); Subrin, supra note 2, at 926 n.90 (citing various
sources for the proposition that colonists distrusted equity courts because of the delays,
expense, and uncontrolled judicial discretion).
22. The earliest colonial courts, for example, exercised general jurisdiction over many
different kinds of disputes that would have fallen into the separate jurisdiction of English
common law or equity courts. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 927 & n.91. Some states simply
combined the two legal systems by permitting their common law courts to hear equity
cases or to grant equitable remedies. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 54. Moreover,
whether operating as a separate court system or combined with the common law courts,
the reach of equity was quite limited in many of the early state legal systems. See
RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 657 (4th ed. 1996).
23. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 927-28 (noting that although the "writ system never
developed the degree of sophistication in America that it achieved in England[,J" the
American legal system relied heavily on common law forms and procedures from its
inception through the 1820s).
24. See Crick, supra note 15, at 553. According to Professor Crick:
In simple actions such as those which composed most of the litigation before the
original common law courts, when the case is begun and finished in a short time,
the limitation of appeal to the last or final judgment works with a fair degree of
convenience, but when confronted with a long and complicated case such as
often characterized the old chancery litigation, it breaks down completely.
Id.
25. See Yeazell, supra note 4, at 642. As Professor Yeazell notes:
Because trials had become more important as the writs decayed, the new
procedure naturally focused on trial. Its chief ingredients were tightened control
over the proof (the law of evidence), increased stress on precision in legal
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the age of common law, civil litigation in the federal system had
entered a new era-the age of trial 6-- where the trial itself had
become the focal point of civil process.
In the nineteenth-century age of trial, an appellate procedure
based on the common law model continued to ensure close appellate
supervision of trial courts.
In this system, "procedure had
concentrated itself on the trial, and trials by their nature yielded
judgments that were subject to prompt appellate review." 27 The
common law final judgment rule permitted rapid review of decisions
made at trial, enabling appellate courts to supervise closely the
procedural and substantive law developed in the course of those
trials.'s In the nineteenth-century age of trial, then, the operation of
the final judgment rule on a trial-oriented system resulted in a
powerful role for appellate courts,2 9 and in a strong link between trial
and appellate procedure that endured until well into the twentieth
30
century.

guidelines (the law of jury instructions), and increased control over the
relationship between evidence and verdicts (directed verdicts and new trial
orders).
d; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 399 (discussing the emergence of these new
branches of procedure and their effect on the relationship between trial and appellate
courts in the nineteenth century).
26. Yeazell, supra note 4,at 646.
27. Id.at 644.
28. On the rare occasions when interlocutory appellate review might be necessary,
whether in cases arising out of common law or equity, federal appellate courts could issue
one of a number of traditional "extraordinary writs." These writs provided a sort of
escape valve, easing application of the final judgment rule where strict application of the
rule might work injustice. One of these writs, the writ of mandamus, is still used with
some frequency by modem appellate courts as an interlocutory review device. The
increasing use of mandamus has been the source of much recent controversy in the context
of mass tort litigation. See infra Parts III & IV. For a discussion of the extraordinary writs
and their historic use as interlocutory appellate review devices, see generally Crick, supra
note 15, at 553-57 (discussing mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus as
"escapes" from the final judgement rule).
29. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 398-403; Yeazell, supra note 4, at 642.
According to Professor Yeazell:
Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century litigation operated under a degree of
appellate scrutiny probably greater than had ever been known in the common
law world. ... If they were so disposed, appellate courts of that era could, as a
practical matter, assure not only that the trial court conducted the trial according
to law, but also that the outcome was consistent with the appellate judges' vision
ofjustice.
Id at 646.
30. Yeazell, supra note 4, at 645-46. Of course, like both the English common law
and equity approaches that had preceded it, the nineteenth-century approach to civil
process suffered from its own serious weaknesses. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 398403 (discussing problems and complexities in nineteenth-century procedure). On many
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Different though they were, the English equity model and the
nineteenth-century American approach to civil procedure had
something in common. Both models reflected a rough attempt to link
appellate and trial procedure-that is, to give appellate courts
powerful tools to review the decisions and supervise the activities of
trial judges. In English equity practice, this tool was virtually
unlimited interlocutory appellate review.3' In the American system,
until the twentieth century, the common law final judgment rule
served a roughly analogous purpose. 2 In both systems, trial and
appellate procedure worked in tandem to ensure that the supervisory
power of appellate courts matched (in the case of English equity) or
even exceeded (in the case of nineteenth-century America) the power
of trial courts.33 This close appellate supervision of rules and
outcomes is precisely what is lacking in the modem federal system,
and in the mass tort regime in particular.
B.

The Twentieth-Century Resurrection of Equity-Based Trial
Procedures: Trial and Appellate ProcedureBecome Increasingly
Uncoupled in the Modern Age of Litigation
In the twentieth century, the strong link between trial and
appellate procedure disintegrated, and the formal uncoupling created
by the Judiciary Act's application of the final judgment rule to all
appeals became increasingly problematic. The engine of change was
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which extended the reach
of equity in trial procedure far beyond what previous reformers had
envisioned, while leaving intact the common law model in appellate
procedure. The drafters of the Federal Rules used trial procedures
that had been designed specifically for federal equity cases as the

levels, the new trial procedure that the system produced could be "a monster of
technicality," and the heightened appellate scrutiny of lower court decisions "tended to
reduce trial judges to a ministerial position." Yeazell, supra note 4, at 645-46. As
Professor Yeazell points out, however, the following can be said in defense of the regime:
"[lit matched the creation of rules with the supervision of their application.... [lts virtue
is that it insured close supervision of both rules and outcomes." ld.
31. See supranotes 17-19 and accompanying text.
32. See supranotes 20-30 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Yeazell, supra note 4, at 646-47 ("During the [nineteenth-century] age of
trial, the final judgment rule resulted in rapid and searching review of procedure. The
system kept a tight rein on trial judges."); see also id. at 640-41 (describing the "tight
connection" between trial and appellate procedure).
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of procedure that attempted to
basis for a new uniform system
"merge" common law and equity.3 4
A true merger of the two very different models proved
impossible, however, and the 1938 Federal Rules transformed trial
procedure by creating a set of flexible equity procedures that
dominated and virtually obliterated the common law." The effects of
34. The Federal Equity Rules of 1912 served as the basis for the unified procedure
established by the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 953,
970-71.
In attempting to "merge" common law and equity, the drafters of the Federal
Rules shared the goals and built upon the work of nineteenth-century jurists who had
attempted to simplify and codify civil procedure in a number of states. The codification
reforms began with New York's 1848 Code of Civil Procedure (known as the "Field
Code"), and by the turn of the century, only three states still clung to traditional common
law pleading. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 391-411 (discussing the history
of the Field Code and its reception in various state jurisdictions). The goal of the
nineteenth-century reformers, however, was not the wholesale abandonment of the
common law, but rather the merger of common law and equity--"to put an end to all
special pleading, forms of action and writs, and to close the chasm between law and
equity." Id. at 392. While the nineteenth-century codes drew heavily upon equity
practice, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 393-94; Subrin, supra note 2, at 933, Professor
Subrin points to powerful evidence that the reformers relied heavily upon the common
law tradition for many of their reforms, as well. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 934-39. He
argues that the code reformers were deeply concerned about limiting judicial discretion,
and they therefore incorporated a number of reforms rooted in common law procedure
into the codes in order to "make equity more like common law." Id. at 938. See generally
id at 933-39 (discussing the procedural reforms instituted by the Field Codes).
The merger of common law and equity envisioned by nineteenth-century
reformers proved to be an elusive goal, however. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 398.
In fact, it may have been the codes' failed attempt to achieve a true merger of common
law and equity that motivated the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules to try a bolder
approach. As an early critic of the Field Code, Justice Samuel Selden of the Court of
Appeals of New York, had argued, "It is possible to abolish [either common law or
equity], but it certainly is not possible to abolish the distinction between them."
FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 393-94 (quoting Reubens v. Joel, 13 N.Y. 488, 493 (1856)).
Subsequent experience with the codes may well have suggested to the Federal Rules'
drafters that this early assessment was correct, and they therefore abandoned the attempt
to achieve a true merger of common law and equity. See Yeazell, supra note 4, at 648
(arguing that "[t]he Rules' drafters intended to end the battles over pleading that ... to
the disappointment of Code enthusiasts, had continued under the Field Codes").
Whatever the reasons behind the shift in favor of equity, the 1938 Federal Rules
represented the final triumph of equity procedure over the common law. See Subrin,
supra note 2, at 974. As such, the Federal Rules extended the reach of equity much
farther than the nineteenth-century code reformers had proposed, and probably much
farther than they would have wished. See generally id at 943-1001 (explaining the
historical background of the 1938 Federal Rules).
35. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 974 ("The Federal Rules were the antithesis of the
common law and the Field Code. Through the Federal Rules, equity had swallowed
common law."). For example, the Federal Rules brought an end to the pleading system
that had characterized the common law period. Pretrial discovery had long been known in
equity practice; the Federal Rules substantially expanded the scope of discovery and made
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equity's triumph were quite dramatic. As Professor Yeazell notes,
"[p]leading, which the Rules essentially abolished as a procedural
hurdle, ended few cases. Trials, as matters turned out, would rarely
occur. The Rules substituted a series of intermediate stages in place
of trials-discovery, joinder, and judicial encouragement of
settlement."36
Thus from the nineteenth-century age of trial, the federal legal
system in 1938 entered a new era: the modern age of litigation.37 In
today's age of litigation, trial procedure is dominated by the Federal
Rules' equity-based procedures-procedures that focus the energies
and resources of trial judges, lawyers, and litigants on pretrial and
settlement, rather than on the trial itself. Moreover, the system gives
trial judges broad equitable powers and a flexibility previously
unknown in the American legal system. 8
At the federal appellate level, however, the twentieth-century
story unfolded in a very different manner. Not only did the
traditional common law rules governing appellate procedure remain
the same; apparently, the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules did not
even consider the possibility of reforming appellate procedure in
order to match the reforms that were taking place in trial procedure 9
Instead, equity-based trial procedures have continued to grow and
develop alongside an appellate procedure still firmly rooted in the
it available in all types of cases. The common law permitted only narrow joinder of parties
and claims; here, too, the Federal Rules adopted and even extended the equity approach
by establishing very broad joinder rules with respect to both parties and claims. See
Yeazell, supra note 4, at 648-54.
36. Yeazell, supra note 4, at 647; see also Subrin, supra note 2, at 913 (noting the
"revolutionary character" of the changes brought about by the implementation of the
Federal Rules).
37. See Yeazell, supranote 4, at 648.
38. One of the characteristic features of the age of litigation is the development of
modern public law litigation. In his classic article identifying this phenomenon, Professor
Abram Chayes describes public law litigation as follows: "[T]he dominating characteristic
...is that lawsuits do not arise out of disputes between private parties about private rights.
Instead, the object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies."
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1284 (1976). Classic examples of public law litigation are cases involving school
desegregation, employment discrimination, and prisoners' rights, as well as some antitrust,
securities, and environmental cases. See id. Professor Chayes points out the importance
of equity-based trial procedures and equitable remedies in the growth of public law
at 1292-96.
litigation. See id.
39. Professor Yeazell explains the problem as follows: "Because the new sphere [of
litigation] lay between pleading and trial, many of the new disputes would evade
immediate appellate review unless we changed the principles of appellate jurisdiction. We
did not; indeed, no one seems to have considered the question." Yeazell, supra note 4, at
660.
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common law. In other words, twentieth-century federal civil
procedure adopted equity's pretrial procedures without adopting
equity's flexible interlocutory review.40 Thus arose the phenomenon
of procedural uncoupling, which began with Congress's decision in
1789 to apply the common law final judgment rule to equity cases,
and was solidified by the 1938 Federal Rules' dramatic expansion of
equity at the trial level. This phenomenon plays a key role in shaping
the modern mass tort regime.4 '
C. The Effects of ProceduralUncoupling
In the modern age of litigation (and particularly in the modern
mass tort regime), the common law final judgment rule operates in a
vastly different legal universe and thus has very different
consequences. As Professor Yeazell notes:
[T]he power of the final judgment rule depends on the
structure of the process preceding appeal. During eras in
which a substantial proportion of trial court rulings
produced judgments, the rule yielded prompt appellate
review and tight appellate control.... By contrast, operating
on processes that produce numerous rulings that do not
result in judgment, the rule will decrease appellate control.4"
In the nineteenth-century age of trial, the operation of the final
judgment rule resulted in an extraordinarily high degree of appellate
scrutiny of lower court rulings. By contrast, in the modern age of
litigation, with its focus on equity-based pretrial procedures, the
application of the common law final judgment rule has resulted in a
decrease in appellate control over trial court rulings, and a
concomitant rise in the power of trial court judges. 43
40. See id. at 661 ("Or, to put matters another way, it was the adoption of equity's
pretrial processes without equity's interlocutory review that reallocated power to the trial
courts.").
41. See infra Part II.
42. Yeazell, supra note 4, at 661.
43. See id. at 646-47 ("During the age of trial, the final judgment rule resulted in rapid
and searching review of procedure .... Today, in the dawning age of litigation, the final
judgment rule results in late and little review."). Professor Carrington has also decried the
decrease in appellate control in the modem federal system. See Paul D. Carrington, The
Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe Pound's StructuralSolution,
15 J.L. & POL. 515,521-22 (1999). According to Professor Carrington:
Because the institutional concerns animating the creation of the courts of appeals
are everyone's business, they are no one's special concern. There is, therefore,
no political constituency for reform facing squarely the erosion of the quality of
the federal appeal as an assurance that district judges and administrative agencies
are accountable for the exercise of their vast powers.
Id.; see also id. at 526 (agreeing with early twentieth-century reformer Roscoe Pound's
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An equally important point, one that Professor Yeazell does not
discuss, is that in the age of litigation, the phenomenon of procedural
uncoupling has a more dramatic impact on some kinds of cases than
others. In cases that are likely to proceed to final judgment, the final

judgment rule presents fewer problems; though the rule may indeed
result in "late and little review," 44 the opportunity for appellate
review remains available. In the ever-increasing categories of cases
where settlement prior to judgment is the norm, however, the final

judgment rule (absent interlocutory review possibilities) results in no
appellate review at all'

In other words, the more a particular

category of litigation is centered around equity-based pretrial
procedures, the less effective the final judgment rule will be to ensure

adequate appellate review. In such cases, the consequences of
procedural uncoupling are particularly dramatic, and the availability
of interlocutory review mechanisms is crucial in ensuring adequate
appellate review.46

II. PROCEDURAL UNCOUPLING AND THE MASS TORT REGIME
Nowhere is the phenomenon of procedural uncoupling more
striking, or its consequences clearer, than in the shaping of the
modem mass tort regime. Mass tort trial judges have taken the
experiment in equity trial procedures begun in the 1938 Federal Rules
in new directions that the drafters of those Rules surely never
envisioned. Despite equity's triumph in mass tort trial procedures,
appellate courts continue to rely heavily on the common law final
judgment rule to supervise the activities of mass tort trial judges. The
result is that a handful of mass tort trial judges are creating, shaping,
and refining the rules that govern the mass tort regime, without
substantial guidance from the appellate courts.

view that "the appeal, if it does nothing else, is necessary to assure the litigants and the
public that the judicial power is not vested in a single individual, but is exercised only by a
larger institution," and noting that "We are so far from the attainment of that purpose
that we now hear serious proposals to make even the first level of review discretionary.").
44. Yeazell, supra note 4, at 647.
45. Cf.id at 648 ("[M]any of the Rules' innovations do not produce a trial court
ruling at all, and of such trial court rulings, most do not result in a final judgment."). This
phenomenon explains the growing concern over improving existing interlocutory review
mechanisms to ensure adequate appellate review in these kinds of cases. See infra Parts
III & IV.
46. In addition to mass tort litigation, one might expect procedural uncoupling to have
a dramatic impact on other categories of litigation in which equity plays an important
role-for example, litigation involving certain kinds of large group civil rights, securities,
or environmental claims.
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The Influence of Equity in the Mass Tort Regime

Historical equity practice has heavily influenced the modern
mass tort regime.4 7 Equity's influence is most prominent in four
major areas: aggregation devices, the use of equitable remedies,
discovery, and judicial encouragement of settlement.' In some of
these areas, the techniques that courts have developed in response to
the mass tort phenomenon trace their roots directly to historical
equity practice.4 9 Others are representative of the general twentiethcentury shift in judicial mood to one that favors flexible approaches
to procedural law that are consonant with historical equity's goals.5"
Regardless of their historical roots, in each of these four major
areas, the procedural devices used in modem mass tort litigation take
equity practice far beyond what historical English equity judges, or
even the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules, would have dreamed
possible. In addition, because these devices (like all equity-based trial
procedures) tend to shift the focus of activity from trial to pretrial and
settlement, they often remain immune from appellate review upon
final judgment 1 The result has been a decided power shift in favor
of mass tort trial judges.

47. See Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269,270. According to Weinstein and Hershenov:
Considerations long associated with equity jurisprudence have driven the
creative procedural and substantive responses of American courts to the many
problems posed by complex multi-party, multi-issue mass tort cases.... [It is in
toxic tort litigation that we can most clearly see equity at work in 'its traditional
roles of adjusting legal rules that do not work well, providing a moral force, and
shaping new substantive law.'
Id (quoting Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical
Analysis of an EarlierProceduralVision, 6 LAw & HIST. REV. 311, 345 (1988))); see also
Schuck, supra note 1, at 968 n.121 ("The common law of mass torts has borrowed
extensively from equity jurisprudence, which empowers courts to exercise broad discretion
in tailoring old doctrines, procedures, and remedies for application to the new, perplexing
problems posed by mass torts.").
48. Novel forms of trial, such as bellwether cases, mini-trials, and the use of statistical
sampling methods, is another area in which the influence of equity can be identified. See
generally Robert G. Bone, StatisticalAdjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World
of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993) (analyzing statistical sampling from
outcome-oriented and process-oriented viewpoints); Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Sampling Damages, 83 IOwA L. REV. 545 (1998) (discussing statistical sampling as a
possible solution to the "numbers problem" in mass tort litigation).
49. For example, the class action device, consolidation, and pretrial discovery trace
their roots to historical equity practice. See infra Parts II.A.1, 3.
50. The use of equitable remedies and judicial encouragement of settlement are
examples of this flexible approach. See infra Parts II.A.2, 4.
51. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of the final
judgment rule on a system dominated by equity-based pretrial procedures).
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1. Aggregation Techniques
The goal of historical equity practice was to bring all parties
whose rights or property were involved in a particular controversy
into the same forum in order to ensure a full, complete, and final
adjudication of the dispute. In the mass tort regime, this historical
goal of equity has taken on a whole new meaning, as modem
aggregation devices rooted in equity practice make possible the
aggregation, adjudication, and settlement of thousands of individual
claims in the same action. 3 Mass tort litigation has achieved this
result largely through two aggregation devices: (1) the class action,
and (2) consolidation through multidistrict litigation. Both devices
trace their roots to English equity practice 4
The class action undoubtedly has been the most powerful
aggregation technique in mass tort litigation to date.55 Most trial
judges have overcome their initial reluctance to use the class action
device in mass tort cases, and many judges now enthusiastically
embrace the device. 6 In addition, the creation of the settlement class
action has resulted in a significant change in the mass tort procedural
52. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 281-82 ("The traditional aim of
equity was 'to have in court all persons whose rights or property are involved in any
particular litigation and to render a complete decree adjusting all the rights and protecting
all the parties against future litigations.'" (quoting CHARLES W. BACON & FRANKLYN S.
MORSE, THE REASONABLENESS OF THE LAW:
THE ADAPrABILITY OF LEGAL
SANCTIONS TO THE NEEDS OF SOCIETY 204 (1924))).
53. See id. at 281-302.
54. The modem class action has its roots in the English equity courts' "bill of peace,"
which enabled a plaintiff to join all clAims and defendants in a single suit. Id. at 284.
Consolidation traces its roots to the English procedure known as "quasi-consolidation."
Id. at 292. Under quasi-consolidation, a court could stay actions pending against a
defendant, and then try all common questions of law and fact in a single suit. Id.
55. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1345 & n.3. According to Professor Coffee:
By the end of the 1980s,... the tide began to turn in favor of class certification,
as the advocates of aggregative techniques increasingly gained the upper hand
over the defenders of individual litigant autonomy. Already, some have
described this transition as a paradigm shift, signaling a fundamental movement
away from the traditional bipolar organization of litigation to a new, more
collectivized structure.
lI at 1344-34.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets forth the requirements for certification of
a federal class action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
56. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 957-58. Professor Schuck points out that "[s]igns of
judicial, scholarly, and professional acceptance of the use of class actions in mass tort
litigation can also be seen in the current proposals to revise Rule 23 which, by setting forth
explicit authority to certify mass tort class actions, are likely to make it easier for judges to
do so." Id. For a general discussion of class action issues in mass torts, see Coffee, supra
note 1; Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
1943 (2000).
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landscape.57 As a result of the settlement class action, the class action
device itself-once the exclusive (and enormously powerful) weapon
of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar-has now become a powerful tool in
the hands of defendants.58 The settlement class action did suffer brief
setbacks when the Supreme Court rejected global class settlements of
asbestos injury claims in Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor5 9 and Ortiz
v. FibreboardCorp.6" In both cases, however, the Court upheld the
validity of the mass tort settlement class action itself.61 Moreover,
recent case law and scholarly commentary suggest that the mass tort
settlement class action has survived and even thrived in the postAmchem, post-Ortiz era.62
Consolidation through multidistrict litigation ("MDL") is
another aggregation device that has proven particularly successful in
Although the rules governing MDL
the mass tort context.63
57. In a settlement class action, plaintiffs for a proposed class and defendants together
present the court with a sort of "fait accompli"-a class action complaint, along with a
proposed settlement of the action. The parties agree beforehand to the composition of the
class, and the court certifies the class (as defined by the parties) for settlement purposes
only. See generally Roger C. Cramton, IndividualizedJustice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement
Class Actions". An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995) (discussing settlement
class actions).
58. According to Professor Coffee:
Originally, the class action was viewed by both sides as the plaintiffs' weapon, a
technique for extorting settlements even in non-meritorious cases.... But [over
the past decade],... [d]efendants have not only adopted the class action as their
preferred means of resolving their mass tort liabilities, but have also actually
begun to solicit plaintiffs' attorneys to bring such class actions (as a condition of
settling other pending litigation between them).... [T]his transformation is of
historic significance: once a sword for plaintiffs, the modern class action is in
some contexts increasingly becoming a shield for defendants.
Coffee, supra note 1, at 1349-50; see also Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of
Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 595, 601 (1997); Ian Gallacher et
al., Back to the Future? ProductLiability Class Actions and ProposedRule 23 Changes, 64
DEF. CouNs. J. 195, 208 (1997) ("Indeed, there are indications that more large businesses
are looking to the class action as a friend rather than a foe as long as the correct settlement
can be negotiated.").
59. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
60. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
61. See Ortiz, 521 U.S. at 848-50; Windsor, 521 U.S. at 619-22.
62. See Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIz. L. REV.
923, 924-25 (1998). See generally Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class Action Update 2001: Mass
Tort Trends, Choice of Law, Rule 23(f) Appeals, and ProposedAmendments to Rule 23,
ALI-ABA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COURSE OF STUDY, Feb. 28, 2001, at WL
SF42 ALI-ABA 757 (discussing post-Amchem and Ortiz case law and analyzing the
impact of these decisions on class action jurisprudence).
63. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supranote 47, at 292-300. The multidistrict litigation
statute authorizes the mandatory transfer of all "civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact ... pending in different districts" for consolidated pretrial
proceedings before a single district judge. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994). The transfer must
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consolidation appear to be quite different from those governing class
certification, in practice aggregation of mass tort claims through MDL
shares much in common with aggregation through class certification.' 4
For

example,

while

the

MDL

statute

formally

authorizes

consolidation for pretrial proceedings only, the MDL device, like the
class action device, most often results in settlement or other
disposition of the transferred cases before the transferee judge. 5 In
some instances, transferee judges have even presided over a mass trial
of the consolidated claims.6 6 In fact, MDL consolidation often proves
to be an even more powerful aggregation technique in mass tort
litigation than the class action device: Individual claimants have no
right to opt out of the MDL consolidation, as they typically do in a
mass tort class action.67
The drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules would scarcely recognize
the dramatic innovations in aggregation techniques that the Federal
Rules' liberal joinder policy made possible. They could not have
foreseen, for example, that a federal judge would one day attempt to
be "for the convenience of the parties and witnesses" and must "promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions." Id.
According to Professor Judith Resnik, "in the first six years of the MDL [enacted
in 19681, about a quarter of the MDL litigations certified were mass torts. In the following
ten years, about a third of the cases certified were mass torts." Judith Resnik, Aggregation,
Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 929 (1995). Professor Resnik also
points out that MDL and the class action device are often used in conjunction to aggregate
a mass tort: "[I]n four of the last five years, half of the cases certified as MDLs included
class action allegations." Id.
64. For an intriguing analysis of the interrelationship between class action and MDL,
see Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1991, at 5, 46-50. Professor Resnik points out that although both devices "have had a
great impact on federal courts' capacity to treat cases in the aggregate and on
contemporary understandings of when aggregation is appropriate,... the 1966 class action
rules were greeted with controversy, while the 1968 MDL statute was met with warm
praise." Id.at 46. She explains that "class actions were expressly aimed at 'enabling
litigation,' "while "the MDL statute was set forth as a vehicle only to 'expedite' litigation
already filed." Thus in Professor Resnik's view, MDL "has been a 'sleeper'-having
enormous effect on the world of contemporary litigation but attracting relatively few
critical comments." Id.
65. See id. at 35 (pointing out that most cases are disposed of in the transferee district,
often by settlement). Professor Resnik quotes a member of the MDL panel, who stated in
1977 that "[in point of fact, slightly less than five percent of the actions transferred by the
Panel have been remanded [to the transferor districts]." ld. (alteration in original); see
also Resnik, supra note 63, at 928 ("While technically these cases are only consolidated for
pretrial practices, functionally MDL is the end point of many cases.").
66. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 292. In Lexecon, Inc v. Milberg,
523 U.S. 26,27 (1998), the Supreme Court ruled that a transferee court lacks authority to
assign transferred cases to itself for trial over the objections of a party. It remains to be
seen what effect, if any, Lexecon will have on MDL consolidation in the mass tort context.
67. See Resnik, supranote 64, at 47; Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 294.
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join potentially millions of individual smokers nationwide into a
single class action against several tobacco company defendants. 68 Nor
could they have envisioned a class action purporting to settle the
claims of potentially thousands of victims of asbestos before those
individuals were even aware that they had asbestos-related injuries. 69
Both of these class actions eventually failed; however, despite some

recent setbacks for proponents of the mass tort class action, courts are
only beginning to map out the possibilities and limitations of
aggregation in the mass tort context. Creative mass tort trial judges
and lawyers may well have merely scratched the surface of the

possibilities for innovation in this important aspect of equity trial
procedure.

2. Use of Equitable Remedies
Another hallmark of historical equity practice was the ability of
equity courts to fashion equitable remedies-that is, specific relief
tailored "both to undo past wrongs and to regulate future conduct."7

Here, too, the modem mass tort regime has greatly expanded the use
of equitable remedies in innovative ways.

One increasingly prominent example of such innovation is the
use of medical monitoring. In medical monitoring cases, rather than
ordering defendants to pay a lump sum for claimants who may
become injured at some future date, trial courts order the creation of
an interest-bearing fund to compensate those claimants for the costs
of monitoring their medical conditions.71 The fund pays a portion of
the claimants' "damages"-the costs of medical monitoring-as the

costs accrue.72

68. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 560-61 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd,
84 F.3d 734,737 (5th Cir. 1996).
69. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd,
83 F.3d 610, 620-24 (3d Cir. 1996), affid, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
591 (1997).
70. Subrin, supra note 2, at 919. Common law courts, on the other hand, generally
awarded only money damages. Id.
71. Thus, for example, the court might create a fund for cigarette smokers who, while
not currently suffering from tobacco-related illnesses, want their medical conditions
monitored so that they can take appropriate action in the event that such illnesses develop
in the future. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 984 F. Supp. 842,852-53,870-73 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) (analyzing whether liability should attach for medical monitoring claims when
the smoker knew or should have known the risks that smoking posed for development of
serious latent diseases), affd, 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998). For a general discussion of
medical monitoring, see Weinstein & Hershenov, supranote 47, at 316.
72. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 316.
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A related equity-based innovation is the use of court-ordered
settlement funds and distribution plans, often with the ongoing
supervision of the fund by the trial court or by a court-appointed
committee. 3 The classic example of this technique is the settlement
and distribution plan created by Judge Weinstein in the Agent
Orange litigation.74 The settlement plan established two separate
funds-a "Payment Program" to provide cash payments to individual
veterans and their families, and a "Class Assistance Plan" to provide
grants to veterans' organizations that provide various kinds of
services to the veterans and their families. 75 As Judge Weinstein and
Eileen Hershenov note: "This kind of arrangement would not have
been possible under strict tort law. It is an example of a court
attempting, with limited resources, to fashion an equitable remedy to
'76
a pressing problem.
Finally, the equity-oriented bankruptcy laws have played a key
role in mass tort litigation. According to Weinstein and Hershenov,
"the strategy employed by some mass tort defendants of seeking
corporate reorganization under the bankruptcy laws ... has
introduced into the mass tort field corporate-insolvency remedies that
73. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 319 ("Some examples of mass tort
resolutions that moved away from the tort system and instead set up administrative,
insurance-type installment payment plans supervised by the courts already exist. In these
plans matters of equity-namely, the value of removing great burdens on the courts and of
achieving closure for the parties and for society-were elevated above the concerns of
giving individual due process or of following strict rules of law.").
74. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS 206-23 (enlarged ed. 1987); see also Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47,
at 320 (discussing Agent Orange plan as equitable remedy). Another prominent example
is the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, a personal injury compensation trust fund
established as part of the A.H. Robins Bankruptcy Reorganization Plan to compensate
women injured by the Dalkon Shield IUD device. See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING
THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 287-325 (1991).
The Agent Orange litigation began in 1978, when several veterans of the Vietnam
War and their families filed suit in the Eastern District of New York against the chemical
companies that had produced the herbicide Agent Orange, used by the United States
military throughout the war as a defoliation agent. By the time the parties settled the
litigation six years later, it had become possibly the largest personal injury litigation in
U.S. history. In May 1984, Judge Weinstein approved the settlement of the Agent Orange
class action, comprising a class of 2.4 million U.S. Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent
Orange, their wives and children, and exposed Vietnam veterans from New Zealand and
Australia. A network of hundreds of plaintiffs' lawyers from around the country
represented the class. For an analysis of Judge Weinstein's approach to managing and
settling the Agent Orange litigation, see infra, Part III.B.1. See generally SCHUCK, supra
(discussing the Agent Orange litigation in detail).
75. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 212-13,220; see also Weinstein & Hershenov, supra
note 47, at 320-21.
76. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 320.
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developed in the courts of equity."77 In the mass tort context,
bankruptcy serves several purposes. First, it serves as a powerful

mandatory aggregation device, bringing together all claimants to a
defendant's funds in one forum 7 and in some cases putting enormous
pressure on those claimants to accept class certification.7 9 Second,

bankruptcy proceedings place considerable equitable powers of
supervision in the hands of the trial court.80 A judge may stay all
federal and state actions while the bankruptcy is pending; in addition,
in the federal system the district court can take over the bankruptcy

and conduct the proceedings itself."s Finally, mass tort bankruptcies
tend to result in the creation of settlement funds and distribution
plans-plans that are "essentially administrative compensation

programs designed to continue for some years.

'

3. Discovery

The broad equity-based discovery rules introduced by the 1938
Federal Rules have played a key role in the growth of the modern
mass tort regime. 3 The broad language of the discovery rules gives
trial judges enormous discretionary power and flexibility in shaping
pretrial discovery in complex cases. Through the use of innovative
discovery rulings, trial judges presiding over mass tort litigation are,
77. Id. at 305. Professor Schuck notes that "[i]n the asbestos field alone, fourteen
companies had [declared bankruptcy] as of July 1991." Schuck, supra note 1, at 947 n.27.
78. In this sense, bankruptcy is similar to MDL consolidation and "limited fund" class
certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), neither of which allows plaintiffs to opt out of the
class.
79. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 290-91 (citing the Dalkon Shield
litigation as an example).
80. See id. at 291, 305.
81. In the Dalkon Shield litigation, for example, Judge Merhige canceled the
assignment of the A.H. Robins bankruptcy to the bankruptcy judge and reassigned the
bankruptcy to himself. See SOBOL, supra note 74, at 60-63.
82. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 320. Weinstein and Hershenov argue
that the reach of equity should be extended much farther in the mass tort context by
treating all mass tort cases as bankruptcy-type proceedings. Id at 303. For an opposing
view, see ALI, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS 12 (1994) ("Serious questions... can be raised as to whether bankruptcy courts
can cope with the massive litigation ancillary to a complex reorganization proceeding, as
well as whether they can achieve equity between early- and late-filing claimants."). See
generally Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983) (examining how an otherwise solvent
company can use the bankruptcy system to protect itself from massive tort liability).
83. Pretrial discovery was a well-established procedural device in historical equity
practice. See Yeazell, supra note 4, at 649 (citing GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY
BEFORE TRIAL (1932)); see also Subrin, supra note 2, at 919 (noting that the defendant's
response to each sentence of the petitioner's bill, as well as to the chancellor's own
questions, was the precursor to modern pretrial discovery).
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to a large extent, able to shape that litigation in the ways that they see
fit.84 Moreover, discovery rulings are virtually immune from appellate
review. s5 Appellate courts' traditional reluctance to interfere in

pretrial discovery is even more likely to be true in mass tort litigation,
where appellate courts are keenly aware of the severe difficulties that
trial courts face in supervising discovery. 6 Thus, the ability to shape
the litigation through discovery rulings, with little or no appellate

supervision, can be an especially powerful tool in the hands of
creative mass tort trial judges."'
4. Judicial Encouragement of Settlement

Federal trial judges have long used the pretrial conference
authorized by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an
occasion for discussing settlement possibilities.88

While judicial

84. In mass tort litigation, the trial judge becomes an active manager of discovery-a
"player" in the process, rather than a neutral umpire. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988) ("In [managing discovery in the
mass tort context], the vista is not exclusively head-to-head, A against B, plaintiff versus
defendant; the relationship is triangular, with the court itself as a third, important,
player."). For a discussion of discovery in mass tort litigation, see, for example, Linda S.
Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Post Aggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort
Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 531-37 (1991) (discussing discovery procedures
in two prominent mass tort cases: Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc. and In re School
Asbestos Litigation).
85. As Professor Yeazell points out, "[a]ppellate review of trial court discovery
rulings is rare; when review does occur, the appellant must demonstrate that the trial court
'abused its discretion,' a standard guaranteeing substantial insulation from appellate
supervision." Yeazell, supra note 4, at 651-52.
86. For an example of an appellate court's reluctance to overturn a discovery order in
a mass tort case, see In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d at 1020
(affirming the discovery order and noting that "[m]indful of the enormity of the litigation,
and of its complexity, the fashioning of a more serviceable judicial handle on the case
seems a consummation devoutly to be wished").
87. Another example of trial court power over discovery in mass tort cases is the
discovery scheduling order approved by Judge Robert Parker in Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., Inc, No. B-86-0456-CA (E.D. Tex. 1989) (stating the discovery plan and schedule
for depositions and medical examinations of the plaintiffs), reprinted in LINDA S.
MULLENIX, MASS TORT LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 500-03 (1996). In
Cimino, Magistrate Judge Earl S. Hines placed severe limits on the amount of discovery
that defendants could obtain from over three thousand individual plaintiffs. See id. In
addition, he limited the depositions of those plaintiffs to forty-five minutes each, on an
expedited calendar schedule. Id. Judge Robert Parker approved Magistrate Hines's plan,
id., and the defendants sought a writ of mandamus from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
to overrule the district court. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 707 (5th Cir. 1990).
The court of appeals refused to reach the discovery issue altogether, despite the
defendants' arguments that the discovery order violated due process and the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 709. Although the Fifth Circuit reversed Judge
Parker's trifurcated trial scheme, the pretrial discovery orders remained intact. See id.
88. Rule 16 was revised in 1983, and again in 1993, to explicitly encourage judicial
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efforts to encourage settlement have greatly expanded throughout
federal civil litigation, 9 judicial encouragement of settlement has
played a particularly crucial role in mass tort litigation. 90
Again, the classic example is Judge Weinstein's role in the
settlement of the Agent Orange litigation. As Professor Peter Schuck
notes: "From the moment Weinstein entered the Agent Orange case,
the goal of settlement was uppermost in his mind." 91 To achieve that
end, Judge Weinstein took the highly unusual step of appointing
special masters specifically for the purpose of facilitating settlement
negotiations. 92 Throughout the settlement process, however, Judge
Weinstein himself remained intimately involved in the details of
hammering out a settlement, even ordering plaintiffs' and defendants'
counsel to attend an around-the-clock weekend negotiating session
on the eve of trial in an attempt to "break the logjam."'9 3 Rather than
merely acting as a settlement facilitator, Judge Weinstein exerted
tremendous pressure on the parties to settle the case. 94 "Weinstein
exploited whatever leverage he could muster over the lawyers. While
not actually threatening retribution if they refused to settle, he did
use the ambiguity of his roles-as mediator and as ultimate decision
maker-to play upon their fears, magnify the risks, and whittle down
their resistance." 95
Judge Weinstein's actions in the Agent Orange settlement may
well represent the most powerful example to date of judicial
encouragement of settlement in the mass tort context. But he is
participation in settlement conferences. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
89. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 (1990)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994)), contributed greatly to this movement by
ordering every federal judicial district to consider the advisability of settlement
conferences when drafting the "civil justice expense and delay reduction plans" required
by the Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 473 (1994).
90. For a general discussion of the role of the judge in settling mass tort and other
complex cases, see Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. Ruv. 337 (1986).
91. SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 143. For a discussion of the settlement process in the
Agent Orange litigation, see id. at 143-67; Schuck, supranote 90, at 337-65.
92. SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 144. In fact, Judge Weinstein relied on the equity basis
of mass tort class actions, and of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally, to justify
this unprecedented action: "Despite the fact that Rule 53 does not expressly contemplate
the use of special masters as we have used them, for example to mediate settlement
negotiations, such uses are within the liberal spirit of the rules and the tradition of equity
from which they arose." Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 302.
93. SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 150.
94. Id. at 160-61. Both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel later complained that
Judge Weinstein had exploited their fatigue and anxiety about the upcoming trial, and had
exerted enormous pressure on both sides to settle the case. Id.
95. Id. at 163.
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certainly not alone in his belief that this is the proper role for a mass
tort trial judge. 96 Furthermore, with recent legislative efforts to
encourage judges to take a more active role in settlement,97 the legal
system can undoubtedly expect to see much more of this type of
judicial activity in future mass tort cases. 98
B.

The First Consequence of ProceduralUncoupling: The Rise of
the Mass Tort Trial Judge

The use of flexible, equity-based trial procedures such as those
discussed above has had an enormous impact on the development of
the mass tort regime. As a result of these procedural devices, the
major battles in mass tort cases occur well before any trial. Indeed, in
the vast majority of cases, the trial judge and counsel for the parties
understand from the outset of the litigation that a trial is extremely
unlikely. 99
Thus, the increasing prominence of equity-based trial procedure

in mass tort litigation has resulted in a dramatic shift in focus from
trial to pretrial maneuvering and settlement, and in a concomitant

shift in power from appellate courts to trial courts. The vast majority
96. See Peter Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 491 (1998) (identifying other mass tort trial judges who have
"employed a broad range of managerial tactics in order to shape the litigation so as to
discourage weak claims, avoid jury trials, and forge settlements"); id. (arguing that "mass
tort judges have sometimes used what might be called strong-arm tactics in order to
pressure lawyers into reaching agreement in cases that might otherwise have gone to
trial").
97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the Judicial Improvement
Act of 1990).
98. Of course, judicial control over all of the procedural devices discussed aboveaggregation, discovery, bankruptcy-can transform these devices into powerful tools in
inducing settlement of a mass tort case. For example, Judge Weinstein stated that one of
his major reasons for certifying the Agent Orange litigation as a class action was to
increase the pressure on the defendants and on the government to settle the case. See In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Third,
certification may encourage settlement of the litigation."), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987); id. at 723 ("Finally, the court may not ignore the real world of dispute resolution
....
[A] classwide finding of causation may ... enhanc[e] the possibility of settlement
among the parties and with the federal government.").
In addition, trial judges may use the unavailability of interlocutory review to
increase litigant uncertainty, thus helping to induce a settlement. See infra note 124 and
accompanying text (discussing trial court refusal to grant interlocutory appellate review as
a means to place pressure on parties to settle).
99. In this regard, Professor Schuck notes: "At a recent conference on class actions,
none of the large group of knowledgeable participants could think of a single nationwide
products liability or property damage class action that had gone to trial." Schuck, supra
note 1, at 958-59 n.85. In settlement class actions, by definition, trial is not even a
possibility.
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of pretrial rulings are not subject to any appellate review at all; for the
handful of rulings that are subject to review, the great deference
accorded to trial judges in pretrial matters virtually ensures that those
rulings will stand.'t° Indeed, in mass tort cases, the problem is
compounded. Inadequate interlocutory review mechanisms ensure
that many highly controversial pretrial rulings will not be reviewed
until a final judgment or settlement is entered. 1 1 When a mass tort
case does eventually reach appeal, however, even very doubtful trial
court rulings that would not have survived interlocutory review are
much more likely to be upheld at this late stage. A carefully crafted
settlement represents months or even years of trial court time,
resources, and energy, and an appellate panel will be extremely
reluctant to overturn such a settlement on any but the most
compelling grounds. 1°2
As a result, one dramatic consequence of procedural uncoupling
has been the emergence and relative independence of "mass tort trial
judges"-that handful of judges who have become specialists and
repeat players in the mass tort arena. °3 By employing an amazing
variety of flexible and innovative approaches to both procedural and
100. See Yeazell, supra note 4, at 651-52.
101. See infra Part III. Of course, I do not suggest that appellate courts should review
every single pretrial ruling in mass tort cases, or even every highly controversial ruling.
Rather, appellate courts must have access to adequate interlocutory review mechanisms to
enable them to review key pretrial rulings when they believe it is necessary-for example,
to provide guidance to lower courts in adjudicating particular disputes, or to shape the
rules governing the mass tort regime generally.
102. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
decision upholding settlement of the Agent Orange litigation, despite its skepticism as to
the validity of key pretrial rulings); see also Schuck, supra note 1, at 973-74 & n.146
(noting that appellate review is a "particularly weak coordinating mechanismlj in the tort
context," and "[t]his point applies a fortiori to mass tort litigation, where the trial judge's
managerial imperatives are so compelling, and where the appellate court is often
presented with a fait accompli that, however legally defective, may be effectively
irreversible.").
103. They include Judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio, Judge
Samuel Pointer of the Northern District of Alabama, Judge Charles Weiner of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, and Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York. Schuck, supra note 96, at 491. According to Professor Schuck, "These judges have
dominated the [mass tort] field almost since its inception, often jockeying to gain control
of the most challenging and notorious cases." Id.; see also Francis E. McGovern, An
Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1821, 1838-41 (1995) (discussing the
transition of the judge's role in mass tort cases "[f]rom umpire to manager to player" and
noting that "judge-shopping has developed into a fine art, and the incentives for judges to
be viewed as gurus of mass torts have become strong"). Professor Schuck further points
out that mass tort trial judges "have even established professional organizations and
informal consultations that actively facilitate learning and coordination in mass tort cases."
Schuck, supra note 1, at 957.
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substantive law, these specialists have become "adept at routinizing
the extraordinary."' 4
Moreover, as a result of the modem

uncoupling of trial and appellate procedure, mass tort trial judges
have created and refined the majority of these innovations with
minimal appellate supervision.
The purpose of this Article is not to enter the highly charged
debate over the appropriateness of the activities of mass tort trial

judges.' Nor do I wish to focus on the appropriate limits of current
innovations in discovery, aggregation, equitable remedies, or
settlement techniques. Rather, my argument is a narrower one: If
dramatic innovations in procedural and substantive law are to take

place as a result of the mass tort regime, mass tort trial judges,
specialists though they may be, must be able to look to the appellate
courts for guidance as to the appropriate limits of such innovation. 1" 6

104. Schuck, supra note 1, at 957; see also id. at 974 n.148 (speculating that "some
judges in mass tort cases, such as Jack Weinstein, Robert Parker, and Thomas Lambros,
sometimes compete to be the most innovative").
105. For example, Professor Mullenix has been a particularly harsh critic of Judge
Weinstein's conception of the trial judge's proper role in mass tort cases. See Linda S.
Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: ParadigmMisplaced, 88 NW. U. L. REv.
579, 580 (1994). She argues:
Indeed, as Judge Weinstein discusses the various functions he believes that the
good judge ought to perform in mass tort cases, one senses that Judge
Weinstein's vision is indeed for the judge to be an instrument of the Lord. Judge
Weinstein's good judge not only knows what constitutes the communitarian
good, but armed with this knowledge, the good judge induces lawyers, claimants,
expert witnesses, court-appointed adjuncts, and the public toward a
transcendental resolution of mass tort cases.
Id. at 590. She concludes, "[a]s for me, I prefer judges in their robes, and on the bench."
Id. at 591.
On the other hand, Judge Weinstein's supporters are equally enthusiastic in
championing his cause and methods. For example, Judge James Oakes, Senior Circuit
Judge for the Second Circuit, comments:
I am a person sufficiently old-fashioned ... who, like Judge Weinstein himself,
still believes that a federal judge can make a difference, and ... should make a
difference when the rest of our political structure bogs down. To be sure, this
requires judicial independence .... If that be "activism," let them make the
most of it; praise Jack Weinstein and pass the ammunition!
James L. Oakes, Jack Weinstein and His Love-Hate Relationship with the Court of
Appeals, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1951, 1957 (1997). For further debate on the proper role of
the mass tort trial judge, see Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 275-77, 321-26
(discussing and responding to various criticisms of the activities of mass tort trial judges
and of the heavy influence of equity in the mass tort regime).
106. Judge Weinstein admits that innovation in mass torts is in need of limits, and
would look in part to federal legislation to address the problem: "Without federal
legislation too much depends on the views of the individual trial judge-in others words,
on the 'size of the chancellor's foot.' " Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 318
(citation omitted). He adds: "We are beginning to address the problem through pending
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Professor Schuck has argued: "However one evaluates these changes,
... they constitute a firm, self-conscious judicial commitment to the

project of systematizing and refining mass tort litigation into a
distinctive genre with its own rules and practices." 10 7 My argument,
then, is that if such a project is to be legitimate, it must proceed with
the active involvement and supervision of the appellate courts.
III. THE APPELLATE COURTS RESPOND TO PROCEDURAL
UNCOUPLING: MASS TORT APPELLATE REVIEW AND THE SEARCH
FOR A MASS TORT INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW DEVICE

There is a slowly developing sense among mass tort scholars and
judges that the mass tort regime is in need of a heightened
superyisory role for appellate courts, and that appellate review in
mass tort cases must come earlier in the litigation rather than awaiting
final judgment."'8 Recognition of the need for heightened appellate
legislation .... Meanwhile, until the law settles down, equity will be available with its
flexibility to fill the breach." Id.
While I agree that some institution is needed to draw appropriate boundaries
around innovations in the mass tort regime, I am skeptical that Congress is the proper
institution to fill this role. Innovation in the mass tort regime occurs at every level of the
legal system, affects virtually every substantive area of the law, and is in a constant state of
evolution as it adapts to the needs of the mass tort case of the moment. As such, it
presents the sort of "moving target" that is rarely amenable to adequate treatment by
legislative reform alone. See also Schuck, supra note 1, at 985-88 (discussing advantages
of judicially-reviewed mass tort settlements over legislatively-enacted administrative
compensation schemes). According to Professor Schuck:
When legislators address controversial subjects like compensation, they employ a
variety of strategic behaviors: ambiguous drafting, deferring difficult issues,
hiding or underestimating costs, and delegating norm elaboration and
implementation tasks to agencies and courts. These behaviors magnify the
notoriously high monitoring costs that any legislature faces in delegating
authority to an agency.
Schuck, supra note 1, at 988.
In addition, I disagree with Judge Weinstein's characterization of equity's role as a
stopgap measure. Rather, equity itself is responsible for much of the arbitrary and
uncontrolled nature of the mass tort regime; as Professor Subrin has pointed out, equity is
an "uncontrolled and uncontrolling procedural system." Subrin, supra note 2, at 944. The
solution is a heightened role for appellate courts in reviewing the innovations of mass tort
trial judges and controlling the excesses of equity-based trial procedures. See infra Part
IV. The appellate courts are uniquely qualified to fill such a role.
107. Schuck, supra note 1, at 958.
108. For example, both the American Law Institute (ALI) and the American Bar
Association (ABA) offered reform proposals that included brief discussions of appellate
review techniques in the mass tort context and made some recommendations for reform of
appellate procedures. See ALI, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 3.07 (Tentative Draft
No. 1 1989); ABA, COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 71 (1989). The increasing use of the writ of mandamus and the promulgation
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which permits discretionary interlocutory review
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review of mass tort cases, however, is only the first and simplest step

toward reform. The real difficulties come in determining what shape
interlocutory appellate review should take-that is, whether existing
interlocutory review devices can be adapted to the mass tort context,

or whether new mechanisms designed specifically for use in mass torts
are needed. The effort to create interlocutory appellate review
techniques specifically designed for mass tort litigation is still in its
But the response of appellate courts to the
initial stages.

phenomenon of procedural uncoupling in these cases has been
particularly interesting. The evolution of appellate review in mass
tort cases indicates a gradual shift in appellate procedure away from
its common law roots to a more flexible equity-based model." 9
A.

The Second Consequence of ProceduralUncoupling: The
Growing Complexity of FinalityJurisprudence
Appellate courts attempting to develop a mass tort interlocutory

review mechanism must overcome an exceedingly difficult problem:
the incredibly complex nature of modern jurisprudence regarding the
timing of appeals. Because strict adherence to the final judgment rule
would be inefficient and unjust in many cases (particularly in equitybased cases), a large number of statutory and judicially-created
exceptions to the rule have developed in a piecemeal fashion over the
last hundred years. These exceptions attempt to permit interlocutory

review in a limited number of cases, while clinging to the final
judgment rule in principle. The result is our modem finality
jurisprudence-a hopelessly, complicated tangle of law that scholars,
judges, and practitioners agree has become "a jurisprudence of
'10
unbelievable impenetrability.'
of class certification decisions, also indicate a growing consensus that mass tort litigation
requires more flexible interlocutory review of trial court decisions. See infra Parts III &
IV.
109. See infra Part III.B.
110. Luther T. Munford, Dangers, Toils, and Snares: Appeals Before FinalJudgment,
15 LITIG., Spring 1989, at 18, 19; see also Martineau, supra note 20, at 729 ("[T]he
unanimous view of commentators is that the rule has either too many or too few
exceptions, but in any event requires revision."); Michael E. Solomine, Revitalizing
Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1990)
(describing interlocutory review procedure as a complex combination of doctrine and
statutes). In a 1988 opinion discussing interlocutory appellate review, Justice Scalia
described the myriad problems surrounding the application of the final judgment rule and
added his voice to the growing number of critics of this aspect of appellate procedure. See
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). For a summary of the statutory and judicially-created exceptions to the final
judgment rule, and the problems created by them, see Martineau, supranote 20,at 729-47.
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An important point that most critics overlook, however, is that
modern finality jurisprudence is in fact a twentieth-century creationa direct consequence of procedural uncoupling."' The final judgment
rule endured virtually unchanged for the first hundred years of the
federal courts' existence." 2 During that time, courts relied exclusively
on the occasional use of a handful of common law "extraordinary
writs" to review the decisions of trial judges. 13 But as equity's
influence has grown over the past one hundred years, so too has the
need for historical equity's easy access to interlocutory appellate
review. Congress and the courts have responded not by abandoning
the common law final judgment rule, but by carving out more and
more exceptions to the rule."4 The result is the dizzying array of
statutory and judicially-created exceptions to the final judgment rule
that make up modem finality jurisprudence.
For mass tort litigants seeking interlocutory review of a
controversial pretrial ruling, modem finality jurisprudence offers at
least four possible routes." 5 First, an interlocutory appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from orders "granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve
or modify injunctions.""' 6 Second, a pretrial order may fall within the
judicially-created "collateral order doctrine," a small class of orders
111. The exception is Professor Yeazell, who makes this point very clear: "One can see
the extent of the reallocation of power [as a result of procedural uncoupling] and the
strength of the pressures against it by contemplating the tortured history of exceptions to
the final judgment rule." Yeazell, supra note 4, at 662.
112. The first statutory provision for interlocutory appellate review appeared in 1891.
Interestingly, it allowed immediate appeal from an interlocutory decree of a lower court
granting or continuing an injunction-an equitable remedy. See Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
517, § 7,26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891).
113. Historically, the available writs were the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, and habeas corpus. In modern practice, however, the technical distinctions
among different writs are generally considered unimportant. See 16 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3932.2, at 513-16 (2d ed. 1996).
114. For example, Professor Yeazell points out the following:
After just a decade's experience with the [equity-based] Federal Rules, the
Supreme Court found itself pressed to invent [the collateral order doctrine as an]
escape category.... One can thus see the collateral order doctrine as a result of
the Rules' creating new stages of pretrial process without changing the final
judgment rule."
Yeazell, supra note 4, at 662-63; see infra Part IH.B.2.a (discussing the collateral order
doctrine).
115. In addition to the exceptions enumerated here, there are a host of other statutory
and judicially-created exceptions to the final judgment rule. For a summary of these
exceptions, see Martineau, supra note 20, at 729-47. These additional exceptions have not
played a significant role in interlocutory appellate review of mass tort litigation, however,
and I do not address them here.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994).
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that are treated as final and thus immediately appealable even though
final judgment has not yet been reached in the entire case." 7 Third,
interlocutory review may be available as a discretionary matter
through one of the extraordinary writs, in particular the writ of
mandamus. 118 Fourth, under the so-called "permissive" interlocutory
appeal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district judge may certify
certain pretrial orders for interlocutory appellate review, and the
court of appeals then exercises its discretion to grant or deny the
appeal."19 Mass tort litigants have used all of these devices to obtain
interlocutory review of trial court rulings, with mixed success. 120 The
courts, especially the Supreme Court, have severely restricted use of
the devices, 2 1 and each device has its own serious limitations in the

mass tort context. l 2
Even

section 1292(b),

the permissive

interlocutory

appeal

provision, has been less successful than its drafters might have hoped.
Section 1292(b) was specifically designed to address the problems
created by strict application of the final judgment rule in complex

117. The collateral order doctrine arose out of the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1941). Under the collateral order doctrine,
an order is final and appealable if it: (1) conclusively decides a disputed question; (2)
resolves an important issue that is collateral to the merits of the action; and (3) is
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). See generally Martineau, supra note 20, at 739-43 (discussing the
collateral order doctrine as an exception to the final judgment rule).
118. In the English common law courts, the extraordinary writs were the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus. The courts of appeals derive their
modem authority to grant extraordinary writs from 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which permits all
federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994). For a discussion of the extraordinary writs and
their historic use as interlocutory appellate review devices, see Crick, supra note 15, at
555-57.
119. See § 1292(b). For a general discussion of permissive interlocutory appeals under
section 1292(b), see 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, § 3929, at 362-400; Martineau,
supranote 20, at 732-34.
120. See infra Part III.B. In addition, the new Rule 23(f) permits interlocutory review,
at the sole discretion of the appellate courts, of district court orders granting or denying
class certification. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Although no mass tort case to date has utilized
Rule 23(f), the provision will likely figure prominently in future appeals of mass tort class
actions. See infra Part IV.B.
121. For a discussion of judicial interpretation limiting each of these devices, see
Martineau, supra note 20, at 730-32; Munford, supra note 110, at 18-21. A possible
exception to this trend is the steady expansion in appellate courts' use of the writ of
mandamus, see Munford supra note 110, at 22, despite the Supreme Court's increasingly
restrictive attitude toward use of this device to escape the final judgment rule. See
Martineau, supra note 20, at 747; infra Parts III.B.2.b & III.B.3 (discussing second- and
third-generation approaches to mandamus).
122. See infra Part III.B.
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cases involving prolonged pretrial activity.1" But its usefulness in the

mass tort context is undermined by the fact that it permits
interlocutory review only if the trial judge agrees to certify the order
to the court of appeals. Mass tort trial judges have powerful
incentives not to certify pretrial orders for interlocutory appellate
review. These judges often use the unavailability of interlocutory
review mechanisms to increase litigant uncertainty, thus placing
additional pressure on the parties to settle the litigation.124 Section

1292(b) is rendered useless in such cases.
Whatever their limitations, the myriad statutory and judiciallycreated exceptions to the final judgment rule are themselves evidence
of an interesting trend in the "tortured history""l of finality
jurisprudence. Modern finality jurisprudence has witnessed the
gradual expansion of interlocutory review devices in response to the
growing influence of equity and the complex cases that equity
produces. In other words, finality jurisprudence has slowly evolved. 6
The first stage was the gradual shift from a fairly strict adherence to
the common law final judgment rule to a series of statutory and
judicially-created exceptions carved out of the final judgment rulethus implicitly recognizing the heightened need for interlocutory
review in certain kinds of cases.1 27 The second stage was the
enactment of section 1292(b). By permitting interlocutory appellate
review without regard to the "finality" of a pretrial order,
section 1292(b) explicitly recognizes the need for interlocutory review
in certain kinds of complex, equity-oriented cases. The addition of
Rule 23(f) to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'28 and the
123. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 113, § 3929, at 363-69.
124. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 124-25 (noting that in the Agent Orange litigation,
Judge Weinstein avoided interlocutory appeals by "avoid[ing] formal opinions and [giving]
many informal signals from the bench," and by refusing to certify interlocutory appeals);
Mullenix, supra note 84, at 494 n.85 (reporting that the district judge in an asbestos class
action was reluctant to certify a class certification order for interlocutory appeal because it
"would undermine his settlement goals"); Solomine, supra note 110, at 1206 (stating that
in the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein refused to certify various issues for
interlocutory appeal in order to encourage a settlement).
125. Yeazell, supra note 4, at 662.
126. For a discussion of the evolutionary tradition in legal theory, see E. Donald
Elliott, The Evolutionary Traditionin Jurisprudence,85 CoLUM. L. REv. 38 (1985). For
an application of evolutionary legal theory to modem civil procedure, see E. Donald
Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306
(1986).
127. For example, the exceptions to the final judgment rule are applied more liberally
in bankruptcy cases, implicitly recognizing the need for heightened review in such cases.
See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
128. Rule 23(f) permits immediate appeal, at the sole discretion of the appellate courts,
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expansion of the writ of mandamus represent a third stage in the
evolution of finality jurisprudence. 129
Both devices permit
interlocutory appellate review of certain kinds of pretrial orders
without requiring certification of the issue by the district judge.
These modem interlocutory review devices thus recognize that even
section 1292(b)'s more flexible conception of appellate review-one
in which the district judge acts as "gatekeeper" to protect the
appellate courts from frivolous appeals-may be inadequate in many
modem complex cases.
B.

From Common Law Courts to Equity Courts: Three Generations
of Mass Tort Appellate Review

To some extent, the evolution of interlocutory appellate review
of mass tort litigation mirrors the evolution of interlocutory appellate
review generally, with appellate courts gradually shifting their
approach from a strict common law model to a flexible equity model.
Thus interlocutory appellate review of mass tort litigation generally
falls within one of three distinct, yet occasionally overlapping,
evolutionary stages, or, as I refer to them here, "generations." In
first-generation appellate review, characterized by the Second
Circuit's approach in the Agent Orange litigation, appellate courts
fail to recognize that mass tort cases may require more aggressive
interlocutory review techniques than other kinds of cases. Firstgeneration courts tend to treat mass tort cases just as they would any
other case, relying primarily on the final judgment rule, or on
occasional section 1292(b) appeals, to review the decisions of mass
130
tort trial judges.
In second-generation appellate review, appellate courts implicitly
recognize the heightened need for interlocutory review in mass tort
litigation.
Second-generation courts accordingly attempt to fit
controversial pretrial rulings into one of the exceptions to the final
judgment rule (in particular, the collateral order doctrine or the writ
of mandamus), thus rendering those pretrial rulings eligible for
interlocutory review.
Characteristic of the second-generation
approach are the appellate courts' decisions in the Pan Am, 1 Dow
Coming,1 z and Bendectin133 cases, among others.1M
of district court orders granting or denying class certification. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
129. See infra Part IV (discussing Rule 23(f) and the writ of mandamus as potential
mass tort interlocutory review devices).
130. See infra Part HI.B.1 (discussing first-generation appellate review).
131. In re Pan Am Corp., 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
132. In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996).
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In third-generation appellate review, characterized by the
Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,"'
appellate courts explicitly recognize that mass tort cases require
heightened interlocutory review of certain kinds of pretrial decisions.
Like second-generation courts, third-generation courts rely on the
writ of mandamus to grant interlocutory review. But in justifying
their decisions to grant the writ, third-generation courts focus the
discussion on the special, equity-based characteristics of mass tort
litigation rather than on the formal requirements of the writ. In my
view, a third-generation approach to interlocutory review is key to
the development of a strong appellate voice in the ongoing dialogue
among mass tort trial judges, practitioners, and scholars. 136 Absent
the broad adoption of such a flexible approach, the shaping of the
mass tort regime will continue, as it has for so many years, without
substantial appellate court supervision.
1. First-Generation Appellate Review: The Agent Orange Example
The Agent Orange litigation provides the most dramatic example
of procedural uncoupling-that is, a common law-oriented appellate
court attempting to review the actions of an equity-oriented trial
court. The litigation began in 1978, when several veterans of the
Vietnam War and their families filed suit in the Eastern District of
New York against chemical companies that produced the herbicide
Agent Orange, a defoliation agent used by the United States
throughout the war. 137 Overseeing the litigation at the trial level was
Judge Jack Weinstein, who, as one commentator noted, may
"justifiably lay claim to the title of King of Mass Torts.' 13 No mass
133. In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
134. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing second-generation appellate review).
135. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
136. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing third-generation appellate review).
137. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 3. For additional background on the Agent Orange
litigation, see supra note 74.
138. Mullenix, supra note 105, at 580. Judge Weinstein inherited the Agent Orange
litigation from Judge Pratt, who had been elevated to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in October 1983. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 110. In addition to the Agent
Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein, now a senior judge on the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, has presided over all or part of virtually every major mass
tort during the past two decades. See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (tobacco); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(handguns); Gonzalez v. Digital Equip. Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(computer keyboards); Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(diethylstilbestrol, or DES); In re Joint E. and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473
(E.D.N.Y., S.D.N.Y. 1995) (consolidated asbestos litigation), afjfd in part and vacated in
part,78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996). Judge Weinstein has also published and lectured widely

2002] APPELLATE REVIEW IN THE MASS TORT ERA

561

tort specialist in the country is more sanguine than Judge Weinstein
about the possibilities and potential of equity-based procedures in
mass tort cases,'3 9 and perhaps no other mass tort trial judge has
taken innovative equity-oriented approaches to mass tort litigation
further than Judge Weinstein. His approach to the Agent Orange
40
litigation was certainly no exception.1
From the very outset of his involvement in the litigation, Judge
Weinstein was the quintessential mass tort trial judge, boldly
"press[ing] all the levers [of judicial control]' 41 in order to induce the
parties to settle the case. For example, he put the case on a
"Draconian trial schedule" 142 and appointed a special master to
accelerate the pace of discovery. 143 In addition, through highly
questionable pretrial rulings on choice-of-law,'" governmental

on mass torts. See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION:
THE EFFECTS OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER

MULTIPARTY DEVICES (1995) (discussing reforms intended to provide individual justice
in mass tort cases); Jack B. Weinstein, Keynote Address, CompensatingLarge Numbers of
People for Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 165 (2001) (introducing
solutions to the problems of mass torts in multinational settings); Jack B. Weinstein,
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469 (1994) (discussing the
special ethical considerations facing both judges and attorneys in the mass tort context);
Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1439
(2001) (describing the continuing role for tort law, rather than administrative regulations
or criminal statutes, in redressing injuries in mass tort cases). He also served as advisor to
the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project, which proposed various reforms
designed to facilitate consolidation of mass tort claims. Mullenix, supra note 105, at 580
n.5. The November 1997 issue of the Columbia Law Review was devoted to a series of
articles reflecting on Judge Weinstein's approach to managing and adjudicating cases. See
generally A Special Issue Dedicated to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1947
(1997). For an entertaining look at Judge Weinstein's unconventional approach to
judging, and the informal way in which he runs his courtroom, see The Talk of the Town:
Benchmark, THE NEW YORKER, May 3, 1993, at 33,34-36.
139. As I noted earlier, Judge Weinstein argues that equity-oriented procedures and
remedies, especially bankruptcy-type proceedings, are most appropriate and effective in
mass tort cases. See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 47, at 277-303. In addition,
Judge Weinstein has argued that "[m]ass tort cases are akin to public [law] litigations
involving court-ordered restructuring of institutions to protect constitutional rights." Jack
B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 472
(1994). For a discussion of the equity basis of public law litigation, see Chayes, supra note
38, at 1292-96.
140. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 111-252 (discussing Judge Weinstein's prominent
role in the Agent Orange litigation); Schuck, supra note 90, at 341-65 (discussing Judge
Weinstein's role in settling the Agent Orange litigation). The following discussion draws
heavily on Professor Schuck's account.
141. SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 265.

142. Id. at 123.
143. See id. at 122-24.
144. See id. at 128-31.
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immunity,14 5 and class certification,146 he shaped the substantive and
procedural law of the case to create additional pressure on the parties
to settle. Most importantly for present purposes, Judge Weinstein
cleverly immunized many controversial pretrial rulings from
interlocutory appellate review by avoiding formal opinions in favor of
"informal" or "preliminary" rulings from the bench, and by refusing
to certify key issues for interlocutory appeal.147

The Second Circuit, however, could not have been more
traditional in its approach to the Agent Orange litigation. Despite
Judge Weinstein's efforts to avoid interlocutory review, the Second

Circuit did have significant opportunities, through mandamus
petitions and collateral order appeals, to review key rulings on
interlocutory review. In every instance, the Second Circuit rejected
these appeals, insisting that interlocutory review was inappropriate,

and noting that it would revisit the issues on appeal from a final
judgment. 48
A classic example of the fundamental disconnect between the
trial court and appellate court approaches to Agent Orange was the
treatment of Judge Weinstein's ruling on class certification. Class
certification was essential to Judge Weinstein's settlement goals,149
and he wasted no time in entering an order certifying a global plaintiff
class. 150 The class certification ruling was highly controversial,
145. See id. at 131-38.
146. See id. at 125-28.
147. See id. at 124-25. Professor Schuck notes that these "informal signals from the
bench.., revealed [Judge Weinstein's] 'preliminary' thinking to the lawyers without really
committing him to a position or inviting time-consuming appeals." Id. at 125.
148. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 745 F.2d 161, 163-66 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that the U.S. Government's appeal of a pretrial ruling that the Feres/Stencel
governmental immunity doctrine did not bar the third-party complaints of the
servicemen's wives and children was not within the "collateral order" exception to the
final judgment rule); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 733 F.2d 10, 12-14 (2d Cir.
1984) (denying the mandamus petition of the U.S. Government regarding the district
court's decision to vacate governmental immunity); In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co.,
725 F.2d 858, 859-62 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying the mandamus petition of the defendant
chemical manufacturers to compel class decertification).
149. Judge Weinstein admitted as much in his decision granting class certification. See
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Third,
certification may encourage settlement of the litigation."), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987); id. at 723 ("Finally, the court may not ignore the real world of dispute resolution
....
[A] classwide finding of causation may ... enhanc[e] the possibility of settlement
among the parties and with the federal government."); see also SCHUCK, supra note 74, at
125-28 (discussing Judge Weinstein's motives for granting class certification).
150. Judge Weinstein entered the order certifying the class in December 1983, only two
months after he inherited the case from Judge Pratt. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 111.
The class included all American, Australian, and New Zealand veterans who claimed
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however, for several reasons. First, the class certification order was
largely without precedent; as Professor Schuck points out, "[n]o
previous class certification had ever been upheld in such broad terms
in a mass toxic tort case. ' 15 1 In addition, to avoid choice-of-law
problems in certifying the class, Judge Weinstein developed a brilliant
but highly controversial theory of "national consensus law"'5 that
was likewise without precedent.153
Finally, Judge Weinstein's
approach to class notice, while "innovative," was "highly questionable
as a matter of law."' 154 Despite the unprecedented nature of his class
certification order, however, Judge Weinstein refused to grant the
defendants' motion to certify the issue for interlocutory appellate
review. 155 The defendants were forced to petition the Second Circuit
for a writ of mandamus to review the ruling. 56
While Judge Weinstein's class certification decision might well
have been overturned on final appeal,'5 7 the defendants' attempt to
obtain interlocutory review of the order received short shrift from the
court of appeals. The court expressed its "considerable skepticism"'' 58
regarding Judge Weinstein's findings on causation, as well as his
injuries from exposure to Agent Orange, as well as family members who claimed injuries
as a result of the veterans' exposure. Judge Weinstein also certified a Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
mandatory class on punitive damages. In re "Agent Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 725-28.
151. SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 125.
152. Because the tort laws of different states were inconsistent with respect to critical
issues in the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein attempted to aggregate a "national
consensus" among the different jurisdictions in order to proceed with the diversity-based
class action even though no such consensus existed. Id. at 130.
153. Indeed, Professor Schuck argues, "Conjure as he might, no 'national consensus
law' existed on these issues." Id.; see also id. at 128-131 (discussing Judge Weinstein's
resolution of the "national consensus law" issue). Again, Judge Weinstein attempted to
shield his choice-of-law ruling from appellate review by noting that his opinion was merely
"'preliminary' and 'provisional,' 'a first general guide to the parties of the court's present
thinking.'" Id. at 130. He further explained that a thorough analysis of his novel
"national consensus law" theory was "a subject for another memorandum." Id.
While highly critical of the approach, Professor Schuck notes the following:
In a stroke, then, Weinstein had accomplished three extraordinary things. He
had emasculated a higher court's ruling. He had created an entirely new choiceof-law doctrine, one of infinite plasticity that he could use to shape the
substantive law-and thus the outcome-of the case. And he had practically
immunized his highly questionable ruling from appellate court review. Not a bad
day's work for a district judge.
Id. at 130-31; cf.infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (discussing national consensus
law in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995)).
154. SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 127. For a description of the notice plan approved by
Judge Weinstein, see id. at 125-28.
155. See In re "Agent Orange," 100 F.R.D. at 735-36.
156. See In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858,859 (2d Cir. 1984).
157. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 127.
158. In re DiamondShamrock, 725 F.2d at 861.
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"national consensus law" theory. 59 Nevertheless, it denied the
mandamus petition, emphasizing the narrow scope of review
available on mandamus and concluding that appellate review would
be more appropriate "when the ramifications of each aspect of the
rulings will be evident."' 6
In fact, the Second Circuit's next opportunity to revisit the class
certification ruling was not until final appeal. Predictably, the court
upheld the ruling, but not without expressing its continued skepticism
of Judge Weinstein's novel theories.1 61 Both at oral argument and in
its opinion upholding class certification, the appellate panel expressed
clear misgivings regarding the appropriateness of the class action
device in the Agent Orange litigation. 62 For example, the court
squarely rejected Judge Weinstein's reliance on "generic causation"
as a common issue of fact justifying class treatment, and it dismissed
Judge Weinstein's finding
of a "national consensus law" on liability as
"patently speculative."' 63 The court further observed that the case
"justifies the prevalent skepticism" regarding the propriety of class
actions in the mass tort context, and it proceeded to devote three
pages of its opinion to a detailed discussion of the reasons
why class
64
certification was not ordinarily appropriate in such cases.
In the end, the Second Circuit upheld Judge Weinstein's class
certification ruling; but it seemed distinctly uncomfortable with Judge
Weinstein's approach, and it reluctantly did so only by relying on very
different theories from those that Judge Weinstein himself had
used. 65 The fact that the court of appeals would find a way to uphold
the class certification order (and other controversial pretrial rulings)
at this final stage of the litigation is not surprising. At this stage of the

159. Id. at 860 (addressing causation); id at 861 (addressing the national consensus law
theory).
160. Id at 862. The court of appeals' reliance on the opportunity for subsequent
appellate review of the class certification decision seems particularly odd given Judge
Weinstein's statement in the class certification order itself that settlement was uppermost
in his mind, and that class certification was in part a means to achieve that goal. See In re
Agent Orange, 100 F.R.D. at 721.
161. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1987).
162. For a discussion of the oral argument and subsequent appellate opinions in the
Agent Orange litigation, see SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 301-14.
163. In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 173; see also SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 309
(discussing the Second Circuit's criticism of Judge Weinstein's ruling on "national
consensus law").
164. See In re "Agent Orange," 818 F.2d at 164-67.
165. The court of appeals relied on the centrality of the military contractor defense, an
issue to which Judge Weinstein in fact had devoted very little attention throughout the
litigation, to justify class certification. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 309-10.
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game, the court of appeals had every incentive to affirm all but the
grossest trial court errors. As Professor Schuck comments:
Confronted by a case this complex, proceedings this
protracted, a record this massive, and a trial judge this
distinguished, any appellate court would be extremely
reluctant to try to untangle all of the intricacies of the case,
much less disturb a delicate, arduously negotiated
settlement.... The Supreme Court was free to hurl that
thunderbolt when the case eventually reached it; but an
intermediate court like the Second Circuit would not feel so
bold. 6 6
The dynamic between Judge Weinstein and the Second Circuit
throughout the Agent Orange litigation is characteristic of the
interaction between an equity-oriented mass tort trial judge and a
common law-oriented appellate court using first-generation appellate
review techniques. In the early stages of the litigation, the appellate
court refused to grant interlocutory appellate review on key trial
court rulings. 16 7 Its insistence on a strict interpretation of the final
judgment rule seems unrealistic (and disingenuous), however, given
the likelihood that Judge Weinstein's early rulings in the case would
force a settlement that would be virtually invulnerable on final
appeal. As Professor Schuck notes, "In a sense, [Judge Weinstein]
played a massive game of chicken in which he made highly
questionable decisions while working for a settlement that would
render them invulnerable to appeal."'" Judge Weinstein's strategy
worked; but it was in part the passivity of the Second Circuit judges,
and their refusal to intervene in the early stages of the litigation, that
ensured the success of his strategy.
Are first-generation approaches to appellate review always to be
avoided, however? After all, from one perspective, the Second
Circuit's passive first-generation approach to the Agent Orange
litigation enabled an accomplished trial judge to negotiate an
extraordinarily difficult settlement that was, in my view, fair and
reasonably efficient. Indeed, appellate "interference" at earlier
stages of the litigation might well have placed that settlement in
jeopardy. I certainly do not intend to imply that appellate courts
should be constantly peering over the shoulders of trial judges in mass
tort cases, or even that the availability of interlocutory review
166. Id at 304.
167. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
repeated refusals to grant interlocutory review on key rulings).
168. See SCHUCK, supra note 74, at 259.
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generally should be greatly expanded in such cases. There is clearly a
need for restraint on the part of appellate courts, and deference to
trial judges in most pretrial matters is an essential element in the
efficient operation of the mass tort regime, just as it is in the legal
system as a whole.
In my view, however, there are two reasons to be skeptical of
passive first-generation approaches to appellate review in mass tort
cases. First, trial judges managing mass tort litigation may not always
be as accomplished as Judge Weinstein, and the results they achieve
may not always be as fair to all parties involved.16 9 In such cases,

heightened interlocutory appellate review of pretrial rulings is
essential to ensuring fairness to the parties.
Second, and most importantly, in making key rulings on
controversial issues of law, mass tort trial judges are not only shaping
the law governing a particular case; they are shaping the substantive
and procedural rules that govern the mass tort regime as a whole.
The courts of appeals have the unique responsibility to supervise the
development of the legal rules governing the mass tort regime to
ensure that these rules fit within the larger legal fabric. When the
majority of these rules are developed through pretrial rulings that
subsequently become virtually invulnerable on final appeal (as Judge
Weinstein's rulings did), the appellate courts will have very little
influence over the development of those rules unless they change
their approach to interlocutory appellate review.
2. Second-Generation Appellate Review: Interlocutory Review
Through the Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule
In second-generation appellate review, appellate courts
recognize implicitly the heightened need for interlocutory review in
mass tort cases. They accordingly attempt to fit controversial pretrial
rulings into one of the exceptions to the final judgment rule, thus
rendering those rulings eligible for interlocutory review. In most
cases, however, the "fit" is quite awkward, and the appellate courts'
attempts to explain why they may take jurisdiction over an appeal do
not withstand much scrutiny.
a. Collateral Order Cases
This awkward fit is evident in the cases that attempt to squeeze
pretrial rulings into the collateral order doctrine. Under the
169. See id. at 265-66 (pointing out that qualified judges will not always be presiding
over such complex cases).
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collateral order doctrine, a small class of orders are treated as final
and thus immediately appealable even though final judgment has not
yet been reached in the case.170 The requirements of the doctrine are
quite strict, however. A pretrial ruling qualifies as a collateral order
only if it: "(1) conclusively determines the question presented, (2)
resolves an important issue that is completely collateral to the merits,
and (3) concerns a right that would be effectively unreviewable after
a final judgment on the merits.'' This final requirement is applied
literally; as Professor Martineau points out, "[t]he only orders the
[Supreme] Court has found to satisfy the collateral order doctrine are
those that involve a right that will be 'irretrievably lost' absent an
immediate appeal.' ' 7 2 The "right" at stake must be a legal right; thus,
for example, courts may not consider the added delay or expense of
unnecessary litigation in determining whether a ruling qualifies for
collateral order treatment. 73
These stringent limitations, particularly the "effectively
unreviewable" requirement, would seem to rule out the use of the
collateral order doctrine for interlocutory review of most
controversial pretrial rulings in mass tort cases. First, few pretrial
rulings in mass tort cases "conclusively" determine a disputed issue; a
trial judge may easily label controversial rulings as "preliminary," as
Judge Weinstein did in the Agent Orange litigation. Second, many
rulings are in fact "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues

170. The collateral order doctrine arose out of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1941). See Martineau,
supra note 20, at 739-43 (discussing Cohen and its subsequent limitations); see also
Munford, supra note 110, at 19 (discussing the erosion of the collateral order doctrine).
Professor Martineau notes that prior to 1978, the collateral order doctrine was "a frequent
device of courts of appeals to avoid the strictures of the final judgment rule. There were
few orders that a determined court of appeals could not qualify under the Cohen opinion."
Martineau, supra note 20, at 740 (footnote omitted). Beginning with its 1978 decision in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), however, "the Court in a series of
cases sent a clear message to the courts of appeals that [the collateral order doctrine] was
to be applied narrowly." Martineau, supra note 20, at 741. For discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in Coopers & Lybrand, and its impact on appellate review in mass tort
cases, see infra notes 201-206 and accompanying text.
171. In re Pan Am Corp., 16 F.3d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Gulfstream v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,276 (1988)).
172. Martineau, supra note 20, at 742 (quoting Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koeller, 472
U.S. 424,430-31 (1985)). An example of an order qualifying for collateral order treatment
is a decision regarding immunity from suit. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
524-30 (1985) (addressing qualified immunity); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43
(1982) (addressing absolute immunity).
173. See Martineau, supra note 20, at 742.
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comprising the ...cause of action," 174 and thus do not qualify under
the second requirement of the doctrine.
Finally, and most
importantly, the vast majority of pretrial rulings do not qualify as
collateral orders because they are, in the literal sense in which the
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase, "subject to effective
review after final judgment,"'17 5 even though that review may come
after years of costly litigation.
Despite the apparent lack of fit, however, litigants have utilized
the collateral order doctrine successfully to obtain interlocutory
review of controversial pretrial rulings in at least two mass tort
cases. 176 In In re PanAm Corp.,'177 over five hundred victims of the air
disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland, filed suit against Pan Am in a
7 8 After
Florida state courtY.
Pan Am filed for bankruptcy in the
Southern District of New York, it moved for an order transferring the
plaintiffs' actions from Florida to the Southern District. 179 The district
court granted the transfer order, and the plaintiffs appealed. 80° The
Second Circuit held that the district court's order qualified for
treatment as a collateral order, and thus it could properly exercise
appellate jurisdiction over the order.'
The second case, In re Dow Coming Corp.,"s also concerned a
transfer order. In In re Dow Coming, Dow Coming and other
manufacturers of breast implants moved for a transfer of all opt-out
claims pending nationwide against the manufacturers to the Eastern
District of Michigan, where Dow Corning had recently filed for
bankruptcy.8 3 The district court refused to grant the motion, and the
manufacturers appealed the rulingY84 The Sixth Circuit, citing In re

174. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469 (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau,

371 U.S. 555,558 (1963)).
175. Id.
176. In a third case, Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707 (3d Cir. 1993), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a district court order
denying intervention to a group of plaintiff class members did not qualify for immediate
appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 714.
177. 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
178. Id at 514.
179. The plaintiffs' motion to transfer was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). Id.
at 516-17.
180. Id. at 514-15.
181. Id. at 516.
182. 86 F.3d 482 (1996).
183. Id. at 486-87. The manufacturers' goal in requesting transfer of the opt-out claims
was to conduct a consolidated trial in the Eastern District of Michigan on the issue of
causation. See id.
184. Id. at 487.
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Pan Am, ruled that it could properly exercise appellate jurisdiction
over the transfer order under the collateral order doctrine. 85
How did the courts of appeals in these cases circumvent the strict
requirements of the collateral order doctrine? First, both courts
interpreted these requirements, particularly the third "effectively
unreviewable upon final judgment" requirement, 186 much more
flexibly than Supreme Court jurisprudence would seem to allow.' 87
For example, the Pan Am court admitted that the third requirement
was "problematic,""' and conceded that "the plaintiffs could get
review of the transfer order after final judgment is entered on their
tort claims." ' 9 But the court dismissed such a rigid interpretation of
the collateral order doctrine in this particular case, noting that it
"would encumber Pan Am with more costly and time-consuming
Instead, the court adopted a more practical, equitylitigation."'"
oriented analysis of the "effectively unreviewable" requirement,
concluding simply that "[a]llowing the plaintiffs to appeal the order
now is far more consonant with principles of efficiency and
fairness."19'
The Dow Coming court was even more cursory in its analysis of
the "effectively unreviewable" requirement. Like the Pan Am court,
it relied on a functional, equity-based approach to this requirement.
It stated simply that "due to the unique circumstances of this case and
the hardship that would inevitably result if we were to refrain from
addressing the issues presented by this appeal at this time, the issues
presented will be effectively unreviewable after a final judgment is
rendered."'19
A second, crucial factor enabled the Pan Am and Dow Coming
courts to employ a functional, equity-oriented approach to these
appeals-the fact that both appeals arose out of bankruptcy

185. Id at 488. The court of appeals also held that the transfer order was immediately
appealable as a "final decision" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. ML For a discussion of the
tug-of-war between the district court and the Sixth Circuit in the Dow Coming
bankruptcy, see infra note 318.
186. See In re Pan Am Corp., 16 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Dow Corning, 86
F.3d at 488.
187. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
narrow construction of the collateral order doctrine).
188. In re PanAm Corp., 16 F.3d at 515.
189. Id. at 515-16.
190. Id. at 516.
191. Id.
192. In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482,488 (6th Cir. 1996).
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proceedings.193 In both cases, the courts of appeals relied on the more
flexible interpretation of the collateral order doctrine applicable in
bankruptcy cases to justify their decisions." The Dow Coming court
explained the basis for the "more relaxed rule of appealability in
bankruptcy cases"1 95 as follows:
Bankruptcy cases frequently involve protracted proceedings
with many parties participating. To avoid the waste of time
and resources that might result from reviewing discrete
portions of the action only after a plan of reorganization is
approved, courts have permitted appellate review of orders
19 6
that in other contexts might be considered interlocutory.
Thus the law recognizes that the more flexible, equity-based
nature of bankruptcy proceedings may require more relaxed rules
regarding interlocutory appellate review, as well.Y In Dow Corning
and Pan Am, the courts of appeals were able to rely on the equityoriented bankruptcy rules to obtain interlocutory review of
controversial pretrial rulings.'98 But this basis for a more relaxed rule
of interlocutory review applies equally in all mass tort cases, whether
or not those cases involve a bankrupt defendant. The equity basis of
the proceedings inheres in the very nature of mass tort litigation itself,
not merely in those mass tort cases that happen to involve a bankrupt
defendant. 199 Because of equity's influence on the mass tort regime,
virtually all mass tort cases involve "protracted proceedings with
many parties participating, ' ' 20 and many cases culminate in complex
global settlement and distribution plans, akin to bankruptcy
reorganization plans. The rules governing interlocutory appellate
review, however, recognize the equitable nature of bankruptcy
proceedings, but not of mass tort litigation generally. As a result, the
flexible interpretation of the collateral order doctrine utilized by the
193. For a discussion of the role of bankruptcy in mass tort litigation, see supra notes
77-82 and accompanying text.
194. In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d at 488; In re PanAm Corp., 16 F.3d at 515.
195. In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d at 488.
196. Id. (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994,1009 (4th Cir. 1986)).
197. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, § 3926.2, at 270-327 (discussing the "flexible
finality" concept in bankruptcy jurisprudence).
198. Appellate courts have relied on the more relaxed rule of appealability in
bankruptcy proceedings in other mass tort cases involving bankruptcy. See In re JohnsManville Corp., 824 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1987); A.H. Robins v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994,
1009 (4th Cir. 1986).
199. See supra Part II.A (describing the influence of equity jurisprudence on the mass
tort regime).
200. In re Dow CorningCorp., 86 F.3d at 488 (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788
F.2d 994, 1009 (4th Cir. 1986)).
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Pan Am and Dow Corning courts will be unavailable, or at least much
more problematic, in mass tort cases that do not involve bankruptcy.
b. The Second-Generation Approach to Mandamus
In an important category of pretrial decisions that have proven
particularly controversial in the mass tort context-class certification
decisions-the United States Supreme Court has ruled out the use of
the collateral order doctrine altogether. In Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 0 1 the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision held that class
certification decisions do not fall within the collateral order
doctrine.2" At issue in Coopers & Lybrand was an appeal from a
denial of class certification; the Court made it clear, however, that
orders granting class certification are also interlocutory and not
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.2 °3
Undeterred by the Supreme Court's ruling, many courts of
appeals found another path for interlocutory review of class
certification decisions-the age-old common law writ of mandamus." 4
Despite the strict requirements that have traditionally given the writ
narrow application, 2 5 appellate courts increasingly rely on mandamus
to obtain interlocutory review over class certification decisions and
other controversial pretrial rulings. As flexible, equity-oriented
techniques continue to proliferate at the trial level, the need for a
flexible, equity-oriented interlocutory review device has become
increasingly apparent. Ironically, appellate courts have turned to the
201. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). As I noted earlier, the Supreme Court's decision in Coopers
& Lybrand marked the beginning of the Court's two-decade-long effort to curtail the
appellate courts' reliance upon the collateral order doctrine to escape the requirements of
the final judgment rule. See supranotes 170-75 and accompanying text.
202. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469.
203. See id. at 476 ("[T]he Courts of Appeals have correctly concluded that orders
granting class certification are interlocutory.").
204. The Second Circuit's decision in In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368
(2d Cir. 1993), serves as an example of this judicial transition from use of the collateral
order doctrine to use of the writ of mandamus. In reviewing a petition to grant immediate
appellate review of a consolidation order under the collateral order doctrine, the Second
Circuit ruled that consolidation orders were too similar to class certification orders and
thus, under Coopers & Lybrand, did not qualify for collateral order treatment. Id. at 372.
However, the Second Circuit treated the collateral order appeal as a petition for writ of
mandamus, and accordingly issued a writ of mandamus vacating the trial court's
consolidation order. Id. at 373.
205. Traditionally, mere error by the trial court was insufficient for an appellate court
to grant a writ of mandamus. Instead, an appellate court generally issued the writ when a
trial court had exceeded its lawful jurisdiction, Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S.
21, 26 (1943), or the trial judge's actions amounted to "a clear abuse of discretion," La Buy
v. Howes Leather Co., 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953), or a "usurpation of power," De Beers
ConsoL. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212,217 (1945).
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traditionally strict, narrow common law writ of mandamus to fill that
need-in the process, transforming modern mandamus into a flexible,
equity-oriented device.2 6
At first glance, mandamus seems to be an unlikely tool for
interlocutory appellate review of class certification orders. First, after
Coopers & Lybrand, there is a serious question whether interlocutory
review of class certification rulings is appropriate at all (other than by
means of the new Rule 23(f)),20 7 even by writ of mandamus. 2 8
Second, the Supreme Court has severely limited the use of the writ
itself, holding that "[mandamus] is not to be used as a substitute for
appeal ... even though hardship may result from delay and perhaps
unnecessary trial. '2 9 Nevertheless, the courts of appeals have
consistently used mandamus to obtain interlocutory review of class
certification decisions in mass tort cases2 1 0 Moreover, they have
relied precisely on the "hardship" likely to result from delay or from
an unnecessary trial to justify the use of mandamus, just as the Pan
Am and Dow Coming courts did in justifying the use of the collateral
order doctrine.2 '

206. See infra notes 255-68 and accompanying text (comparing the three generations of
appellate review and noting the shift toward a more flexible, equity-oriented use of
mandamus in the third-generation approach).
207. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f) (permitting immediate appeal, at the sole discretion of the
appellate courts, of district court orders granting or denying class certification); see infra
Part IV.B (discussing Rule 23(f)). Of course, the promulgation of Rule 23(f) moots the
question whether interlocutory review of class certification decisions is appropriate under
Coopers & Lybrand.
208. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304-07 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Rovner, J., dissenting).
209. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964) (citations omitted). As I discuss
in Part IV, however, in practice the issuance of writs of mandamus is much more flexible
than Supreme Court jurisprudence would suggest. See infra Part IV.C.
210. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996); In re RhonePoulenc, 51 F.3d at 1304; In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 1988); In re
Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 307 (6th Cir. 1984). But see Baxter Healthcare
Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 121 F.3d 714, No. 96-70243, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
21047, at *:4 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying a petition for writ of mandamus to vacate a class
certification order because the petitioner had an alternative ground for relief). Mandamus
has been used to obtain interlocutory appellate review over other kinds of pretrial orders
in mass tort cases as well. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Sch. Litig. (Pfizer), 46 F.3d 1284, 1296
(3d Cir. 1994) (issuing a writ of mandamus to vacate a district court order denying
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment); In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11
F.3d 368, 374 (2d Cir. 1993) (issuing a writ of mandamus to reverse a district court order
consolidating cases); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (issuing a
writ of mandamus to reverse a district court order consolidating cases).
211. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc,51 F.3d at 1297-98; In re Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 304.
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A classic example of this technique is the Sixth Circuit's decision
in In re Bendectin.212 In In re Bendectin, the district court certified a
non-opt out, limited fund settlement class action for all persons who
had been exposed to the drug Bendectin.213 Several individual
plaintiffs petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a writ of mandamus to
vacate the trial court's certification order.214 In ruling on the petition,
the Sixth Circuit applied a five-factor test to determine whether
mandamus was appropriate.2 15 Like the Pan Am and Dow Coming
courts, however, the Bendectin court rejected a rigid application of
the test in favor of a flexible, equity-oriented approach.
For example, the second factor of the Sixth Circuit's test for
mandamus required a showing of "irreparable harm"-in the court's
words, that "[t]he petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way
not correctable on appeal." '16 Like the Pan Am and Dow Coming

courts' interpretations of the "effectively unreviewable upon final
judgment" requirement for collateral orders, the Bendectin court
rejected a literal interpretation of the "irreparable harm"
requirement in favor of a functional one. To the defendants'
argument (clearly correct in the literal sense) that "the plaintiffs can
challenge the certification order by appealing the settlement, ' 21 7 the
court responded simply: "The petitioners in this case clearly would
be prejudiced by having to wait for an appeal from a settlement
order. If this class certification is allowed, these plaintiffs would have
to expend time and resources contesting a settlement offer that is
being forced on them by [the defendants]." 2181 In short, the court

212. 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
213. Id. at 302.
214. Id. at 303.
215. The Bendectin court adopted the five-factor test for mandamus developed by the
Ninth Circuit in Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977). In re
Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 304. The five factors are:
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct
appeal, to attain the relief desired. (2) The petitioner will be damaged or
prejudiced in a vay not correctable on appeal.... (3) The district court's order is
clearly erroneous as a matter of law. (4) The district court's order is an oftrepeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules. (5) The
district court's order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first
impression.
Id. (citing Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654-55). For analysis of the Bauman factors and their
application in the mass tort context, see infra Part IV.D.1.
216. In re Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 304.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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ruled, "the petitioners would be prejudiced by having to wait for such
an appeal, and therefore such an appeal is an inadequate remedy. "219
In addition, the Bendectin court explained that the unique
character of the litigation, and the novelty of the issues raised by it,
justified the writ of mandamus:
Several of the issues raised by the class certification are of

first impression in this Circuit. This Court has never been
faced with a non-opt out class certification for settlement

purposes only. Moreover, the sheer magnitude of the case
makes the disposition of these issues crucial as several

hundred litigants are waiting for a decision before
proceeding with their cases.'
For these reasons, the court issued the writ of mandamus and ordered
the trial court to vacate the class certification order 2t
In In re Fibreboard Corp.,' the Fifth Circuit did not even

pretend to perform a rigorous analysis of the mandamus
requirements before issuing the writ. In In re Fibreboard,Judge
Robert Parker attempted to try more than three thousand asbestos
cases pending in the Eastern District of Texas in a single, mass trial. 223
He developed an unprecedented three-phase trial procedure. Phase I
was to be a single, consolidated trial proceeding under Rule 42(a), in
which the jury would return a verdict on common defenses and
punitive damages. 4 Phase II was to be a single class action trial
219. Id.
220. Id. at 307.
221. Id. In a more recent opinion, the Sixth Circuit used an even more flexible
approach in issuing a writ of mandamus to vacate a class certification order. See In re Am.
Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1077-78 (6th Cir. 1996). The American Medical Systems
court used the same five-factor test, noting that these factors were "considerations to be
balanced, not prerequisites that must all be met." Id. at 1078. Unlike the Bendectin court,
however, the court in American MedicalSystems focused its analysis almost exclusively on
the third factor-whether the district court's order was "clearly erroneous as a matter of
law." Id. This approach enabled the court to focus its energy almost exclusively on the
substantive issues in question rather than the procedural requirements of the writ of
mandamus. As for the "irreparable harm" requirement, the court essentially interpreted
the requirement out of existence, making it synonymous with the question of district court
error:
Although it is difficult to quantify irreparable harm, we believe the district
judge's numerous errors in this case display an utter disregard for the judicial
process, and suggest such a strong bias in favor of class certification, that
petitioners' rights to fair process throughout the course of the litigation in the
trial court can only be protected by issuance of the writ.
Id. at 1087-88 (footnotes omitted).
222. 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
223. Id. at 708.
224. Id.
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based on certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class.2 The court would try
the cases of the class representatives; the jury would also hear
evidence and testimony from thirty additional "illustrative" claimants
(fifteen chosen by each side), as well as expert testimony using
statistical sampling to extrapolate the total damage award? 6 Based
on this evidence, the jury would make classwide findings on the issues
of exposure and actual damages0 7 In Phase III, the court would
distribute the jury's actual and punitive damages08 Defendant
asbestos companies petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of
mandamus to vacate Judge Parker's pretrial consolidation and class
certification orders0 9
The Fibreboardcourt began its opinion by dutifully laying out
the stringent requirements for issuance of the writ of mandamus. °
But the court never, made any attempt to demonstrate how the
pretrial orders at issue met these requirements. Instead, the court's
opinion focused exclusively on the novel issues of procedural and
substantive law raised by Judge Parker's unprecedented, highly
controversial trifurcated trial schemeP 1 The court rejected Judge
Parker's approach, but not without an apology of sorts to the trial
judge:
We admire the work of our colleague, Judge Robert Parker,
and are sympathetic with the difficulties he faces. This grant
of the petition for writ of mandamus should not be taken as
a rebuke of an able judge, but rather as another chapter in
an ongoing struggle with the problems presented by the
phenomenon of mass torts.... We encourage the district
court to continue its imaginative and innovative efforts to
confront these casesP 2
225. 1& at 708-09.
226. See id. at 709.
227. Id

228. Id. at 707.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 707.
231. See id at 708-12. The court held that Phase II could not proceed because it did
not meet Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement. hM at 712; see FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3) (requiring that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting the individual members"). The court pointed
out that the plaintiffs "suffer from different diseases, some of which are more likely to
have been caused by asbestos than others." In re Fibreboard,893 F.2d at 712. It also
pointed to the plaintiffs' differing circumstances regarding exposure and lifestyle. Id. It
concluded, "There are too many disparities among the various plaintiffs for their common
concerns to predominate." Id. The court also suggested that Phase II might be a violation
of the defendants' right to a trial by jury, but it did not decide that issue. Id.
232. In re Fibreboard,893 F.2d at 712. The Fifth Circuit noted with sympathy Judge
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Other appellate courts issuing writs of mandamus in mass tort
cases have concluded their opinions with similar expressions of
sympathy for the trial court. 3 Such expressions of sympathy, highly
unusual in mandamus opinions generally, speak to the fundamental
tension underlying the use of mandamus in mass tort cases.
Historically, issuance of a writ of mandamus was appropriate only in
the most extreme cases, when it was required "to confine an inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction. '"234 Mere error
by a trial court was not sufficient for issuance of the writ; rather, the

trial judge's actions had to amount to a "clear abuse of discretion"
' 36
or a "usurpation of power.

5

'1

As litigation at the trial court level has become more and more
equity-based, however, appellate courts have increasingly turned to
the writ of mandamus as a flexible interlocutory review device
capable of meeting the growing need for equity-based interlocutory
appellate review. But the old, strict requirements for mandamus have

remained. And while second-generation appellate courts dutifully
cite those old requirements, their decisions reflect a clear sense of
Parker's observation that "the trial of these cases in groups of 10 would take all of the
Eastern District's trial time for the next three years." Id at 708. It also acknowledged
Judge Parker's concern that "to apply traditional methodology to these cases is to admit
failure of the federal court system to perform one of its vital roles in our society ...an
efficient, cost-effective dispute resolution process that is fair to the parties." Id. at 709.
But it concluded:
We are told that Phase II is the only realistic way of trying these cases; that the
difficulties faced by the courts as well as the rights of the class members to have
their cases tried cry powerfully for innovation and judicial creativity. The
arguments are compelling, but they are better addressed to the representative
branches-Congress and the State Legislature. The Judicial Branch can offer the
trial of lawsuits. It has no power or competence to do more.... [T]he procedures
here called for comprise something other than a trial within our authority. It is
called a trial, but it is not.
Id. at 712.
233. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995). The
Seventh Circuit offered the following statement:
With all due respect for the district judge's commendable desire to experiment
with an innovative procedure for streamlining the adjudication of this 'mass tort,'
we believe that his plan so far exceeds the permissible bounds of discretion in the
management of federal litigation as to compel us to intervene and order
decertification.
Id; see also In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 307 (6th Cir. 1984)
("Although we shall issue the writ, we realize that the district judge has been faced with
some very difficult problems in this case, and we certainly do not fault him for attempting
to use this unique and innovative certification method.").
234. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21,26 (1943).
235. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249,257 (1957).
236. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212,217 (1945).
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discomfort with them, and a decided tendency to ignore the
requirements or to interpret them out of existence-all evidence of
the fact that those requirements no longer fit the modern, equitybased use of the writ of mandamus as a pure interlocutory review
device.
Whether relying on the collateral order doctrine or the writ of
mandamus, appellate courts using second-generation appellate review
techniques tend to employ much more flexible, equity-oriented
interpretations of the various exceptions to the final judgment rule
than Supreme Court jurisprudence would seem to allow. By their
willingness to "bend" the final judgment rule in this way, secondgeneration courts implicitly recognize the equity-based nature of mass
tort litigation and the heightened need for interlocutory appellate
review in those cases. In addition, they seem much more cognizant
than first-generation courts of the importance of their own role in
providing supervision and guidance to trial judges in shaping the rules
of the mass tort regime.
3. Third-Generation Appellate Review: In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc.
By explicitly addressing both the need for heightened
interlocutory review in mass tort cases, and the inadequacy, or lack of
"fit," of existing mechanisms, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc237 marks a new approach in interlocutory
appellate review of mass tort cases. In In re Rhone-Poulenc, over
four hundred hemophiliacs filed suit nationwide against drug
companies that manufactured blood solids, alleging that the
defendants' products had infected them with the AIDS virusY8 After
the suits were consolidated for pretrial discovery in the Northern
District of Illinois, the MDL district judge certified a nationwide class
action to try the sole issue of the defendants' negligence.P9
Under the trial court's scheme, the jury would render a classwide
special verdict on the negligence question. If the special verdict
found the defendants negligent, individual members of the class
would then use the special verdict, in conjunction with the collateral
estoppel doctrine, to establish negligence in subsequent individual
tort suits.2 40 Not surprisingly, the defendants petitioned the Seventh

237.
238.
239.
240.

51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id at 1296.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
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Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate this unprecedented class

241
certification order.

In an opinion by then-Chief Judge Posner, the Rhone-Poulenc
court began its analysis as any second-generation appellate court
would-by dutifully citing the narrow scope of mandamus and the
strict requirements for issuance of the writ.242 But there are telling
differences in the Rhone-Poulenc court's approach.
First, as
previously noted,243 second-generation courts, in granting mandamus
to vacate a class certification order, do not address at all the potential
conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay.244 Rather than ignoring the Coopers & Lybrand problem,
the Rhone-Poulenc court directly confronted the issue. It attempted
to carve out an exception to the Supreme Court's rule that "orders
granting class certification are interlocutory,

' 245

a rule that would

appear to admit no exceptions. But the Rhone-Poulenccourt quickly
found a way of distinguishing Coopers & Lybrand:
The point of cases like Coopers & Lybrand is that
irreparable harm is not enough to make class certification
orders automatically appealable ...not that mandamus is

never appropriate in a class certification setting. There is a
big difference between saying that all class certification
rulings are appealable as of right because they are final
within the meaning of section 1291 (the position rejected in
Coopers & Lybrand) and saying that a handful are-the
handful in which the district judge committed a clear abuse
of discretion.246
Second, the Rhone-Poulenc court adopted a very different
approach to the "irreparable harm" requirement. Second-generation
appellate courts typically rely on vague notions of "prejudice" or
"hardship" resulting from delay or from an unnecessary trial
(impermissible under a strict reading of Supreme Court precedent)247
to satisfy the "irreparable harm" requirement; or, alternatively, they
ignore the "irreparable harm" requirement altogether in issuing the

241. I at 1294.
242. Id at 1294-95.
243. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
244. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
245. Id. at 476.
246. In re Rhone-Poulenc,51 F.3d at 1295.
247. The Supreme Court has held that "[m]andamus is not to be used as a substitute
for appeal ...even though hardship may result from delay and perhaps unnecessary trial."
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964); see supra Part III.B.2.b.
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writ of mandamus.2" By contrast, the Rhone-Poulenc court offered a
detailed analysis of the "irreparable harm" requirement. First, it
noted that even if a final judgment was entered in the case, "it will
come too late to provide effective relief to the defendants ....
[because of] the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class action,
in contrast to the individual actions pending or likely, exposes
them."249
The risk to the defendants, the court explained, was directly
related to the case's status as a mass tort-the problem of the
"elasticity" of mass torts." According to the court: "[I]f the class
certification stands[,] ... [a]ll of a sudden [defendants] will face
thousands of plaintiffs."' 1 As a consequence, the defendants might
"easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability ... and with it
bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it
mildly. They will be under intense pressure to settle. ' 'z52 Finally, the
court reached the crux of the problem: "If [the defendants] settle, the
class certification-the ruling that will have forced them to settlewill never be reviewed." 3 Thus, the court concluded, the class
certification order would inflict "irreparable harm" on the

248. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 1996)
(employing a relaxed standard of "irreparable harm"); In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1273
(11th Cir. 1988) (granting mandamus, but not discussing the irreparable harm
requirement).
249. In re Rhone-Poulenc,51 F.3d at 1297.
250. In an article that first identified the elasticity problem, Professor McGovern
described the "elasticity strategy" of mass tort plaintiffs' lawyers as follows:
What [these] lawyers care about is not just maximizing the value of each case
individually, but maximizing the number of claimants they can aggregate and
thereby increasing the total number and value of all of their cases. They are
looking for ways to make the tort more elastic by expanding the bounds of
liability, causation, and damages; by simplifying and expediting procedures; and
by increasing the number of claimants and thereby increasing the total value of
the claims.
McGovern, supra note 103, at 1831. Plaintiffs' lawyers utilize several techniques to
accomplish these goals. First, they "attempt to expand legally actionable torts" by relying
on theories such as strict liability. Id. Second, they "seek to develop facts that will support
aggregation and apply to a large number of claimants" by focusing on issues of defendant
culpability and general causation rather than individual causation and liability. Id. at
1832-33. Finally, they have succeeded in "lowering the financial and legal barriers to
accessing courts" and lowering their own transaction costs by employing efficient pretrial
discovery techniques. Id. at 1833. Defendants, of course, have developed their own
strategies to combat elasticity. See id- at 1834-36. For a discussion of the concept of
elasticity in the mass tort context, see McGovern, supra note 103, at 1827-36.
251. In re Rhone-Poulenc,51 F.3d at 1298.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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defendants, and issuance of the writ of mandamus to vacate the order
was appropriate2 4
Like the appellate courts applying second-generation appellate
review techniques, the Rhone-Poulenc court used the writ of
mandamus as a pure interlocutory review device. But while secondgeneration courts implicitly recognize the equity-based nature of mass
tort litigation and the heightened need for interlocutory appellate
review in those cases, the Rhone-Poulenc court was much more
explicit in recognizing these factors. In justifying the issuance of the
writ, the court focused its analysis on the equity-based realities of
mass tort litigation. It recognized the elasticity problem in mass torts,
that the vast majority of mass tort cases settle prior to final judgment,
and that the pretrial rulings of mass tort trial judges have enormous
influence in determining the outcome of those settlements. 5 Given
these realities, as the court correctly held, strict adherence to the final
judgment rule simply does not make sense in the mass tort context.
By explicitly recognizing the equitable nature of mass tort
litigation at the trial level, the Rhone-Poulenc court made a much
more convincing argument in favor of the need for heightened
interlocutory review in such cases generally, and of the issuance of the
writ of mandamus in this particular case. Thus, ironically, in granting
the common law writ of mandamus, the Rhone-Poulenccourt acted as
an equity appellate court, weighing the equities involved in the timing
of appeal and concluding that immediate intervention was required.
As the previous analysis illustrates, the evolution of interlocutory
appellate review of mass tort litigation has been characterized by
three distinct "generations." Each generation represents a different
tactical approach by appellate courts, but all are attempting to
grapple with the broad problem of applying common law-based
appellate procedure to an equity-oriented mass tort regime. By
explicitly confronting this problem, third-generation courts are more
successful in defending their decisions to grant interlocutory review in
particular cases. More importantly, the third-generation approach
addresses the broader problem by contributing to the development of
a flexible, equity-oriented interlocutory review device. Utilizing a
more conservative, indirect approach, second-generation courts must
rely on unconvincing legal contortions to justify their decisions to
grant interlocutory review; moreover, the "ad hoc" quality of the

254. Id. at 1299.
255. Id. at 1298-1300.
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second-generation approach does not address the broader need for a
flexible interlocutory review device in mass tort litigation generally.
Of course, the most significant contrast in approach (and in
outcome) is found not between second-generation and thirdgeneration appellate courts, but between appellate courts applying
common law-oriented first-generation techniques, and those applying
equity-oriented third-generation techniques. A classic example is the
very different treatment accorded to the "national consensus law"
issue confronted by both the first-generation Agent Orange court, and
the third-generation Rhone-Poulenc court. As mentioned earlier, on
mandamus the Agent Orange court expressed its "considerable
skepticism as to the existence of a 'national substantive rule' " on
product liability.256 Using a strict first-generation interpretation of the
mandamus requirements, however, it refused to find the district
court's ruling in that regard to be "a palpable error remediable by
mandamus.' 'z 7 But on appeal from final judgment, the Agent Orange
court found other grounds on which to uphold the class
certification 5 8 In fact, it devoted only a scant paragraph to the
"national consensus law" theory, rejecting the theory, but with
virtually no analysis of the issue2 9
Using third-generation appellate review techniques, the RhonePoulenc court's thorough analysis of the "national consensus law"
theory stands in sharp contrast to the Agent Orange court's cursory
treatment of the issue. The Rhone-Poulenc court first noted that
"[t]he Second Circuit was willing to assume dubitante that [a national
consensus law existed in regard to] the issues certified for class
determination in the Agent Orange litigation. '260 But, the court
continued, "[w]e doubt that it is true in general, and we greatly doubt
that it is true in a case such as this. ' 261 The Rhone-Poulenc court then
devoted three pages of its opinion to a careful analysis and rejection
of the "national consensus law" theory.2 62 It rejected the district
court's attempt to condense the negligence law of so many
jurisdictions into one jury instruction, holding that in this regard, "the
256. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 (2d Cir. 1984); see supra
notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
257. In re DiamondShamrock, 725 F.2d at 861.
258. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1987)
(upholding the class certification order based on the "centrality of the military contractor
defense" to the litigation).
259. Id. at 165.
260. In re Rhone-Poulenc,51 F.3d at 1300.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1300-02.
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district judge exceeded the bounds of permissible judicial discretion.
He propos[ed] to have a jury determine the negligence of the
defendants under a legal standard that does not actually exist
'
anywhere in the world."263
The court also suggested that the
"national consensus law" approach would amount to a violation of
the Erie doctrine. 164
By relying on first-generation appellate review techniques and
refusing to use the writ of mandamus to rule on the national
consensus law question at an early stage of the litigation, the Agent
Orange court allowed a key, highly controversial issue in mass torts to
evade appellate review. As a result, the court sent mixed messages to
mass tort lawyers and trial judges regarding the likely validity of the
theory in future mass tort cases. By contrast, in Rhone-Poulenc, the
application of third-generation appellate review techniques enabled
the appellate court to rule on this controversial theory at an early
stage of the litigation. In so doing, the Rhone-Poulenc court sent a
clear signal to mass tort trial judges that the "national consensus law"
theory went too far in attempting to solve the choice-of-law problem
inherent in diversity-based mass tort class actions.
Not only did the Rhone-Poulenc court address the controversial
choice-of-law problem; the court also took the opportunity to express
its views on other key substantive and procedural issues in mass torts.
First, the court addressed the "economic blackmail" problem that
often confronts defendants in mass tort class actions. 65 Second, the
266
court discussed Seventh Amendment limitations to bifurcation.
Finally, the court urged district courts to exercise caution in using
aggregation techniques such as class certification on "immature" mass
263. I& at 1300. Then-Chief Judge Posner suggested that the district court's proposed
jury instruction would require the use of "Esperanto," and he concluded that the
variations in state law would render the class unmanageable. Id.
264. See id. (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938)) (suggesting that
because a national consensus law would require aggregation of the negligence laws of all
fifty states, an Erie violation would result because this technique would amount to the
application of federal common law).
265. Id. at 1298-99. The court expressed its concern that even though the defendants
had won 92.3% of cases that had proceeded to trial, a class action would nonetheless force
them to settle because a jury of six persons would "hold the fate of an industry in the palm
of its hand." Id. at 1299.
266. Id. at 1302-03. The district court's trial plan called for bifurcation of class issues of
the defendants' negligence from individual issues of comparative negligence and
proximate causation. Id. at 1303. The appellate court held that these issues are
inseparable, and as a result multiple juries would be examining the issue of the defendants'
negligence in violation of the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 1302-03. It noted that while
certain issues may be separated for class consideration, "the district judge must carve at
the joint." Id. at 1302.
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torts.2 67 Not surprisingly, the Rhone-Poulenc opinion has become a
seminal decision in mass torts, sparking a spirited debate in the courts
and among scholars on all of these issues. 26s
A third-generation approach to interlocutory appellate review
not only enables appellate courts to play a vital role in shaping the
267. See ld. at 1299-1300. The court noted the following:
With the aggregate stakes in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, or even
in the billions, it is not a waste of judicial resources to conduct more than one
trial, before more than six jurors, to determine whether a major segment of the
international pharmaceutical industry is to follow the asbestos manufacturers
into Chapter 11.
Id. at 1300; see infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing the concept of "maturity" in mass torts, and
arguing that appellate courts should take maturity into account in deciding whether to
grant interlocutory review of pretrial rulings).
268. Rhone-Poulenc has invigorated debate about numerous issues surrounding mass
torts. First, the decision has greatly contributed to the dialogue regarding the importance
of choice-of-law issues in class certification decisions. Compare, e.g., Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741-43 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a district court must
consider variations in siate law before certifying a class), and Fisher v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co., 181 F.R.D. 365, 368-69 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that variations in state law
make crafting understandable jury instructions nearly impossible), with In re Copley
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456,459, 460-61,464-66 (D. Wyo. 1995) (holding that the
decision to manage a class under differing state laws falls within the discretion of the trial
court). Second, Rhone-Poulenc has raised debate about "economic blackmail" concerns.
Compare, e.g., Bartlett H. McGuire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action
Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 385-86 (1996)
("[T]he certification of such tenuous claims can lead to settlements that are very unfair to
defendants."), with Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc, 97 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the "economic blackmail" argument), and In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.,
172 F.R.D. 271, 275-76 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (disagreeing strongly "with those Circuit Courts
which have allowed their apparent economic biases to influence" their class certification
decisions). Third, Rhone-Poulenc has influenced the debate regarding whether courts
should examine the underlying merits of plaintiffs' claims in ruling on class certification
motions. Compare McGuire, supra, at 381-85 (supporting the examination of the
underlying merits of the plaintiffs' claims in deciding whether to certify a class), with
Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1232 (rejecting the argument that courts should consider the merits
of plaintiffs' claims before determining class certification), and In re Copley, 161 F.R.D. at
460 (holding that consideration of the merits of a claim is prohibited when deciding
whether to certify a class). Fourth, Rhone-Poulenc's analysis of the Seventh Amendment
limitations to bifurcation of mass tort class actions has sparked contrasting opinions.
Compare Castano, 84 F.3d at 751 (agreeing with Rhone-Poulenc that Seventh Amendment
concerns are raised when issues are bifurcated because there is a chance that a second jury
will reexamine issues tried by the first jury), with Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1232 (stating that
Rhone-Poulenc'sSeventh Amendment concerns regarding bifurcation "may not be fully in
line with the law of this circuit"), and In re Copley, 161 F.R.D. at 461 (holding that
bifurcation of mass tort class actions is valid and necessary). Finally, Rhone-Poulenc has
sparked debate regarding the use of aggregation techniques on immature mass torts.
Compare In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J.,
specially concurring) (stating that the use of aggregation techniques "to resolve immature
mass tort actions has been disfavored"), and Castano, 84 F.3d at 745-50 (concluding that
aggregation of immature mass torts may be necessary to promote fairness to the
defendant).
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litigation at hand. More importantly, as the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Rhone-Poulencdemonstrates, a third-generation approach
gives appellate courts an important voice in the ongoing dialogue
among mass tort trial judges, practitioners, and scholars. This
dialogue is shaping the substantive and procedural law that governs
the mass tort regime as a whole, and it is one from which a strong
appellate voice has been absent for far too long.
IV.

CHOOSING AN INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW MECHANISM FOR THE
MASS TORT REGIME: AN ANALYSIS OF TWO INITIATIVES FOR
REFORM

Appellate review of mass tort litigation is slowly evolving in
response to the phenomenon of procedural uncoupling-from a strict,
common law-oriented first-generation approach to a flexible, equityoriented third-generation approach. This evolutionary process is still
in its earliest, most tentative stage of development, however. It
remains to be seen whether the interlocutory review devices that
appellate courts have utilized thus far are really best suited to the
special demands of mass tort litigation, or whether they can be
improved. Over the past two decades, numerous proposals have
offered various reforms of the rules governing appellate review 69
269. Various scholars have proposed a wide variety of reforms in appellate review
techniques. The proposed reforms run the gamut, from modest initiatives to reduce
appellate caseloads to bold proposals that would introduce sweeping structural and
systemic changes in the federal court system itself. For commentary on reform of the final
judgment rule and interlocutory review, see, for example, Paul D. Carrington, Toward a
Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at
165, 165-70 (proposing a federal statute governing interlocutory appeals); Edward H.
Cooper, Timing As Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, 47 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1984, at 157, 163 (arguing in favor of a "more openly discretionary
system of interlocutory appeal"); Martineau, supra note 20, at 748-70 (analyzing proposals
for reforming the final judgment rule); Martin H. Redish, The PragmaticApproach to
Appealability in the Federal Courts,75 COLuM. L. REV. 89, 91-92 (1975) (arguing that the
final judgment rule should be relaxed through the "increased intelligent use of the
pragmatic approach to the appealability of interlocutory orders"); Maurice Rosenberg,
Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1984, at 171, 171-79 (commenting on the interlocutory review reforms advanced
by Carrington and Cooper); Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: An Interlocutory
Restatement, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1984, at 13, 13-248 (attempting to
restructure statutory and case law regarding the final judgment rule and interlocutory
appeal provisions into a "Restatement" based on an analysis of existing case law). For
commentary on appellate review generally and structural reform of the appellate system,
see, for example, Thomas E. Baker, A GenerationSpent Studying the United States Court
of Appeals: A Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 395, 395-422 (2000) (collecting and
analyzing studies and recommendations of previous scholarly and judicial commissions
focusing on appellate reform); Carrington, supra note 43, at 525-29 (discussing early
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While the majority of these proposals are not designed specifically for
use in mass tort cases, they do address the problem of appellate
review of complex litigation generally, and may be adaptable to the
mass tort context. The final part of this Article suggests criteria for
choosing among the competing proposals. It then examines the two
initiatives for reform that have thus far received the most attention
and are the most promising for use in the mass tort context: the new
Rule 23(f), and the expanded use of the writ of mandamus.
A.

Criteriafor the IdealInterlocutory Review Device: Providing
Flexibilityand Limiting Access

The ideal interlocutory review device for mass tort litigation is
one that enables appellate courts to establish and maintain a delicate
balance between two equally important, yet conflicting, goals. On the
one hand, the ideal interlocutory review device must provide
flexibility by permitting interlocutory review, at the sole discretion of
the courts of appeals, of a wide variety of lower court decisions.
Equity practice has exerted a powerful influence on the development
of the mass tort regime in at least four distinct areas: aggregation
devices, the use of equitable remedies, discovery, and judicial
encouragement of settlement. 270 To address adequately the problem

twentieth-century reformer Roscoe Pound's proposal that federal appeals be conducted by
oral hearing before a three-judge panel sitting in the district court, and suggesting that
modem reformers adopt some version of Pound's proposal); Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking
the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 93 (1985) (proposing a
"straightforward cert. (or partial cert.) system" in which only certain types of cases would
be entitled to an appeal, and the remaining cases would be appealed at the discretion of
the appellate court); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul
of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REv. 11, 15 n.19 (summarizing various reform
proposals); Donald P. Lay, A Proposalfor Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of
Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151, 1151-58 (1981) (arguing in favor of a complete abandonment of
appeal of right); J. Dickson Phillips, The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1984, at 1, 1-12 (examining the goals and values served
by a formal approach to appellate review as opposed to a flexible approach). These
authors do not specialize in mass torts, however, and they do not discuss the unique
problems presented by mass tort litigation or apply their reform proposals specifically to
the mass tort context.
The first significant appellate reform proposals specifically geared toward mass
tort litigation appeared in 1989, in reports published by the American Bar Association and
the American Law Institute. The reports made a variety of recommendations for
procedural reforms geared toward mass torts and other complex litigation; both reports
also included brief discussions of appellate review techniques in the mass tort context and
made some recommendations for reform of appellate procedures. See ALI, supra note
108, § 3.07; ABA, supra note 108, at 1-87. For a discussion of these reform proposals, see
Martineau, supranote 20, at 760-64.
270. See supra Part II.A.
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of procedural uncoupling, an interlocutory review device must enable
appellate courts to intervene in any of these areas in order to provide
guidance to trial courts and to participate in the development of new
substantive or procedural law.
On the other hand, the ideal interlocutory review device must do
an adequate job of limiting access to interlocutory appellate review.
Although heightened interlocutory appellate review is, in my view,
crucial to the proper development of the mass tort regime, appellate
courts should not be constantly peering over the shoulders of mass
tort trial judges, ready to pounce on any questionable pretrial ruling.
In the first place, such an approach is simply not practicable in light of
the much-lamented (and much-debated) caseload crisis already facing
the courts of appeals.27 1 More importantly, excessive appellate
oversight of mass tort trial judges would hinder the development of
the mass tort regime itself, which depends on the ingenuity and
creativity of enterprising trial judges for its lifeblood. Additionally,
trial judges presiding over complex mass tort litigation must retain a
substantial amount of power to conduct the litigation as they see fit.
The ideal interlocutory review device, then, must preserve the
traditional gatekeeping function of the final judgment rule itself: It
must limit access to appellate review, enabling appellate courts to
reject quickly frivolous appeals on matters insignificant to the final
outcome of the litigation or to the development of the law.
B. A FirstAttempt at Reform: Interlocutory Review of Class
Certification Orders Under Rule 23(f)
In 1998, the Supreme Court amended the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to add a new Rule 23(f).2 72 This rule permits immediate
appeal, at the sole discretion of the appellate courts, of district court
orders granting or denying class certification.2 73 Unlike the other
271. See Dragich, supra note 269, at 12-17, 25-28 (describing the acute caseload crisis
facing the federal courts of appeals), and sources cited therein; Martineau, supra note 20,
at 719-26 (discussing "dramatically increasing [appellate] caseloads" and Congress's
response to them).
272. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f), 523 U.S. 1223 (1998).
273. The rule provides the following:
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an
order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this
rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An
appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or
the court of appeals so orders.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f). The Advisory Committee's note accompanying Rule 23(t) explains
that under the new rule,
[t]he court of appeals is given unfettered discretion whether to permit the appeal,
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proposed amendments to Rule 23, which failed to be enacted, Rule
23(f) proved surprisingly uncontroversial from the beginning,
generally receiving the approval of scholars and practitioners alike.27 n
Thus far, the First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have issued
opinions articulating standards for granting interlocutory review
under Rule 23(f).275
While the case law interpreting Rule 23(f) is in an early
developmental stage, some preliminary observations can be made.
The First, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits generally agree on the
broad categories of cases in which interlocutory review under Rule
23(f) may be appropriate. First, a Rule 23(f) appeal may be
appropriate when the class certification decision will effectively end
the litigation by creating a "death knell" situation for either the
plaintiff or the defendant.276 Second, the circuits agree that a Rule
akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for
certiorari.... Permission to appeal may be granted or denied on the basis of any
consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note. See generally Michael E. Solomine &
Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory
Review by the United States Courts of Appeals under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1531 (2000) (examining the history of Rule 23(f) and proposing criteria for granting
appeals under Rule 23(f)).
274. See, e.g., Gallacher et al., supra note 58, at 211-12 (arguing that if the proposed
amendments to Rule 23 were adopted, "a body of appellate law defining the acceptable
parameters of class certification will begin to develop more reliably"); Linda S. Mullenix,
The Constitutionalityof the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIz. L. REv.
615, 619 (1997) ("On the merits, this amendment is a sound rulemaking solution to the
burgeoning problem of using mandamus as a back-door method to obtain interlocutory
review of orders granting class certification."). But see Amy Schmidt Jones, Note, The Use
of Mandamus to Vacate Mass Exposure Tort Class Certification Orders,72 N.Y.U. L. REv.
232,263-64 (1997) (criticizing the proposed Rule 23(f) and arguing that the increased use
of mandamus is a better solution). For a summary of the other proposed amendments to
Rule 23, see Mullenix, supra,at 619-24.
275. See Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1274-77 (11th Cir. 2000); Waste Mgmt.
Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293-94 (1st Cir. 2000); Blair v. Equifax Check
Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1999). Interestingly, none of the Rule 23(f)
appeals thus far has involved mass tort litigation.
276. See Prado-Steiman,221 F.3d at 1274; Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 293; Blair,181 F.3d at
834. Thus, a Rule 23(f) appeal may be available in the classic "death knell" situation, in
which class certification is denied and the plaintiffs' claims are too small to justify the costs
of individual litigation. Blair,181 F.3d at 834. Conversely, Rule 23(f) may be available to
review a "reverse death knell" situation, in which a grant of class status raises the stakes of
the litigation, thus placing pressure on defendants to settle (the situation faced by the
defendants in In re Rhone-Poulenc). See Prado-Steiman,221 F.3d at 1274; Mowbray, 208
F.3d at 293; Blair, 181 F.3d at 834. The circuits also agree that a petitioner seeking to
invoke a "death knell" situation to justify the appeal must "demonstrate that the district
court's ruling on class certification is questionable." Blair,181 F.3d at 835; see also PradoSteiman, 221 F.3d at 1274 ("[A] court should consider whether the petitioner has shown a
substantial weakness in the class certification decision, such that the decision likely
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in certain cases that
23(f) interlocutory appeal may be appropriate
2 77
present important, unsettled legal issues.
But these appellate decisions also suggest that the Seventh
Circuit, consistent with its third-generation approach to interlocutory
appellate review, may be more aggressive than the First and Eleventh
Circuits in granting petitions for review under Rule 23(f). For
example, while all three circuits would review cases involving
important legal issues, the Seventh Circuit's standard is much more
lenient than those of the First and Eleventh Circuits. The Seventh
Circuit appears to be willing to grant all Rule 23(f) appeals that
"facilitate the development of the law," in particular fundamental
issues relating to class actions and the proper interpretation of Rule
23 generally.2 7 The First and Eleventh Circuits would grant only
those appeals that "will permit the resolution of an unsettled legal
issue that is important to the particular litigation as well as important
in itself."279 Moreover, the First and Eleventh Circuits state clearly
that they will limit interlocutory review under Rule 23(f) to the
exceptional case,2 0 but the Seventh Circuit's opinion includes no such
constitutes an abuse of discretion."); Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 295 ("[N]o matter how strong
the economic pressure to settle, a Rule 23(f) application ... also must demonstrate some
significant weakness in the class certification decision."). This approach is consistent with
the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 23(f), which endorse the use of Rule 23(f)
appeals to address both "death knell" and "reverse death knell" situations. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee discussed both of these
situations as follows:
An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in
which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment
on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the
costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force
a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and
run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's notes.
277. See Prado-Steiman,221 F.3d at 1275; Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 294; Blair, 181 F.3d at
835.
278. See Blair,181 F.3d at 835.
279. Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 294. The First Circuit expressed concern that the Blairrule
might "encourage too many disappointed litigants to file fruitless Rule 23(f) applications,"
because "a creative lawyer almost always will be able to argue that deciding her case
would clarify some 'fundamental issue.'" Id.; see also Prado-Steiman,221 F.3d at 1275
(adopting Mowbray interpretation).
280. See Prado-Steiman,221 F.3d at 1273 (noting that given the large numbers of class
actions filed each year, "routinely granting interlocutory appellate review of class
certification decisions is simply not practicable"); Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 294 (emphasizing
that "interlocutory appeals should be the exception, not the rule[,]" as "many (if not most)
class certification decisions turn on 'familiar and almost routine issues' ") (citation
omitted). The First and Eleventh Circuits emphasize that a class certification decision is
provisional, and that in the typical case a district court should have the opportunity to
amend that decision as the litigation progresses. See Prado-Steiman,221 F.3d at 1273-74
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restrictive language."1 If the Seventh Circuit continues to apply a
more liberal standard than other circuits in reviewing Rule 23(f)
petitions, the result will likely be a more highly developed
jurisprudence not only on the proper application of Rule 23(f), but
more importantly, on the fundamental legal issues surrounding class
actions.
Rule 23(f) is an important first attempt at reforming
interlocutory appellate review, but it is inadequate to address the
general need for heightened interlocutory review in mass tort
litigation. On the one hand, the standards outlined in these early
appellate decisions effectively limit the possibility for frivolous
appeals under Rule 23(f), while ensuring the Rule's availability to
review the most important class certification decisions. Rule 23(f)
should prove to be a useful device for interlocutory review of class
certification decisions, an important category of pretrial rulings that
have proved particularly problematic in the mass tort context. In
addition, by limiting its reach to class certification decisions, Rule
23(f) meets one of the criteria that I identified: It does a reasonably
good job of limiting access to interlocutory review to a narrow class of

pretrial rulings.
On the other hand, Rule 23(f) fares less well under the second
criterion: providing flexibility. Class certification decisions certainly

are not the only pretrial rulings that may require heightened
interlocutory review. Controversial, innovative pretrial rulings in
mass tort cases run the gamut, from consolidation orders to discovery

rulings to summary judgment rulings on matters of substantive law.m
("[Ilnterlocutory appellate review of a class certification decision may short-circuit the
district court's ability-or at least willingness-to exercise its power to reconsider its
This possibility is troubling, because class certification
certification decision ....
determinations are so fluid and fact-sensitive that district courts should be encouraged
rather than discouraged from reassessing [the class certification decision]."); Mowbray,
208 F3d at 294 ("We should err, if at all, on the side of allowing the district court an
opportunity to fine-tune its class certification order, rather than opening the door too
widely to interlocutory appellate review.") (citation omitted).
281. In fact, the Seventh Circuit suggests that courts should be less reluctant to grant
interlocutory review pursuant to Rule 23(f) than pursuant to section 1292(b), because
delay in litigation is less problematic under Rule 23(f). It notes that "[j]udges have been
stingy in accepting interlocutory appeals by certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
because that procedure interrupts the progress of a case and prolongs its disposition."
Blair,181 F.3d at 835. But the court points out that "Rule 23(f) is drafted to avoid delay.
Filing a request for permission to appeal does not stop the litigation unless the district
Because stays will be infrequent,
court or the court of appeals issues a stay ....
interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f) should not unduly retard the pace of litigation."
Id.
282. See supra Part II. See generally 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
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In short, Rule 23(f) performs its gatekeeping function too well, and as
a result suffers from underinclusiveness. By carving out a narrow
exception to the final judgment rule for class certification decisions,
Rule 23(f) leaves many other equally controversial pretrial rulings
untouched.
In addition, with two Supreme Court decisions and several
influential appellate court decisions on the books,2 3 courts have
already made a great deal of progress in mapping out the proper
boundaries of mass tort class actions. Moreover, if courts continue to
restrict the innovative use of mass tort class actions, the locus of
innovation (and controversy) at the trial level will shift to other areas
of procedural and substantive law, such as consolidation, multidistrict
litigation, or bankruptcy proceedings.2 Thus, long after courts have
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1802.1, at 489-93 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing appealability of
orders in class actions other than rulings on class certification); 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2006, at 76-93 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
appellate review of discovery orders); 9 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2386, 2392, at 466-69, 515-18 (2d ed. 1995)

(discussing appellate review of orders granting or denying consolidation or separate trials);
9A id § 2615, at 707-09 (discussing appellate review of orders of reference to special
masters); 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, § 3935.3, at 604-19 (discussing interlocutory
appellate review of discovery orders); 16 id § 3935.4, at 619-26 (discussing interlocutory
appellate review of orders granting or denying transfers of venue).
283. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (determining "the
conditions for certifying a mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under
[Rule 23]"); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (holding that a
"class-action certification [seeking] to achieve global settlement of current and future
asbestos-related claims" failed to satisfy Rule 23); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, 97 F.3d
1227, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court's decision to grant class
certification was an abuse of discretion where plaintiffs failed to meet some of the key
requirements of Rule 23); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996)
(decertifying a multistate class because the district court failed to consider differences in
state law and how a trial on the merits would be conducted); In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d
1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (granting mandamus and decertifying a class because the district
court disregarded the requirements of Rule 23); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting mandamus and decertifying a class because the district
court exceeded its authority in attempting to streamline the mass tort adjudication).
284. In fact, evidence indicates that such a shift is already occurring. A case in point is
In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997), which involved the consolidation
in the Eastern District of Texas of over 3,000 claims for damages arising from the alleged
improper handling of a crude oil storage waste pit. Id at 1017. Judge Robert Parker
ordered a unitary trial on general causation issues, as well as a trial on the individual
claims of a "bellwether" group of thirty claimants. Id. The Fifth Circuit granted the
defendant's request for a writ of mandamus on the ground that Judge Parker had failed to
make a finding that the bellwether group was representative of the larger group of
claimants from which they were selected. Id. at 1019-20.
An example of an issue arising in the context of multidistrict litigation proceedings
is the controversial practice of Judge Charles Weiner of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania as MDL judge presiding over the consolidated federal asbestos cases. He
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resolved the difficult class certification issues that Rule 23(f) was
designed to address, mass tort litigation will still require heightened
interlocutory review in these other areas. The underlying problem
lies not (as Rule 23(f) suggests) in a particular procedural device such
as the class action; rather, the problem lies in the equitable nature of
mass tort litigation itself. Rule 23(f)'s piecemeal approach to
interlocutory review will therefore be of limited usefulness in
enabling appellate courts to address the many controversial issues
that are sure to develop in the future of the mass tort regime.
C. A Better Solution: The Expanded Use of Supervisory and
Advisory Mandamus
To address effectively the problem of procedural uncoupling in
the mass tort context, courts must adopt a bolder approach. In order
to gain the flexibility necessary to ensure a strong appellate voice in
the development of the mass tort regime, appellate courts should
continue to loosen some of the restrictions on access to interlocutory
appellate review in appropriate cases. In other words, more courts
need to adopt a third-generation equity-oriented approach to mass
tort litigation. Courts should therefore consider a second alternative
for reform of interlocutory review in the mass tort context: the
continued expansion of the writ of mandamus.
In some respects, the common law writ of mandamus is not an
obvious candidate for a third-generation approach to interlocutory
review. Under the traditional formulation, an appellate court may
issue a writ of mandamus only in extraordinary circumstances, when a
district court has improperly exercised its jurisdiction.'
Traditionally, mere errors by a district judge, no matter how
egregious, were insufficient to justify use of the writ.86

severed punitive damages claims from actions remanded for trial and retained jurisdiction
over those claims. See In re William Lee Roberts, 178 F.3d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1999). The
Third Circuit denied an asbestos claimant's mandamus petition seeking to halt the practice
on the ground that the plaintiff should have sought relief from the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, which has sole authority to remand claims to a transferor court.
Id. at 183-84. In both of these cases, Rule 23(f) would have been useless to appellate
courts wishing to hear the issues on interlocutory appeal.
285. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, § 3933.1, at 540. An early Supreme Court
case, for example, explains that mandamus is appropriate only where it is absolutely
necessary in order "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21,26 (1943).
286. See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1967).
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While modem mandamus opinions often give lip service to the
traditional formulation, however, there is no question that the
traditionally narrow conception of mandamus practice has expanded
significantly over the past few decades.' 7 Modem courts have long
recognized a much more flexible conception of the writ, one that
acknowledges its role as a pure interlocutory review device, without
regard to traditional inquiries into district court jurisdiction. A court
may, for example, issue a writ of mandamus to correct a practice of
repeated error by a district court-the so-called "supervisory
mandamus." 28 In addition, a court may use the writ of mandamus to
address novel, important questions of law-the so-called "advisory
mandamus." 9 The Supreme Court has approved the supervisory and
advisory uses of mandamus, explaining that these modem uses of the
writ "serve[] a vital corrective and didactic function" by permitting
appellate courts to address issues that might otherwise elude
appellate review.

In many respects, supervisory and advisory mandamus practice
seems tailor-made for use in mass tort cases-in a sense, the ideal
mechanism for a third-generation approach to appellate review.
Supervisory and advisory mandamus practice is certainly flexible
enough to meet the need for heightened interlocutory review
wherever that need might arise in the mass tort regime. In order to
reign in an overly ambitious mass tort trial judge or to address a novel
legal issue, an appellate court may, at its sole discretion, use the writ
of mandamus to review any pretrial ruling on any issue of procedural
or substantive law. In fact, the inherent flexibility and discretionary
nature of supervisory and advisory mandamus have led the Supreme
Court to characterize mandamus as "one of the most potent weapons
in the judicial arsenal. 29 ' It is not surprising, then, that when
appellate courts began searching for an interlocutory review device

287. See generally 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, §§ 3933-3934.1, at 527-88
(discussing the traditional use, development, and expansion of the writ of mandamus).
288. Supervisory mandamus grew out of the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), which expressly approved the use of mandamus
to exercise "supervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals." lIdat
259-60.
289. The Supreme Court approved advisory mandamus in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 110 (1964). For a discussion of supervisory and advisory mandamus, see 16
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, §§ 3934-3934.1, at 565-88. It is important to note that
while the terms "advisory" and "supervisory" are often employed in the scholarly
literature, the courts seldom use the terms. 16 id. § 3934, at 566.
290. Will, 389 U.S. at 107.
291. Id.
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for use in mass tort cases, many of them found what they were
9
looking for in supervisory and advisory mandamus practice? 2
At the same time, in its strength also lies the inherent danger of
supervisory and advisory mandamus practice: Over-utilization of the
writ may lead to the weakening of the traditional gatekeeping
function that is so essential to any interlocutory review device. If
used indiscriminately, supervisory and advisory mandamus practice
threatens to "expand into a method of permissive interlocutory
appeal,"2 93 overwhelming the appellate courts with frivolous petitions
and impeding the resolution of mass tort litigation at the trial level.
The crucial question, then, in determining whether mandamus
should be the interlocutory review device of choice in mass tort
litigation, is this: Can courts find ways to avail themselves of the
superior flexibility of modem supervisory and advisory mandamus
practice, while at the same time preserving the gatekeeping function
of the traditional writ? I am convinced that they can do so. By
adopting the following strategies in utilizing the writ of mandamus,
appellate courts can achieve both goals.
D.

Strategiesfor Mapping Out the Boundariesof Mandamus Practice
in the Mass Tort Context

1. Develop Existing Standards Governing Supervisory and Advisory
Mandamus
The first strategy that appellate courts can employ in developing
mandamus for use in mass tort cases is a straightforward one: the

292. See supra Parts III.B.2.b and III.B.3 (discussing the use of mandamus in secondand third-generation approaches to interlocutory appellate review). Interestingly, while
these courts clearly employed modem supervisory and advisory uses of mandamus to
reverse controversial pretrial rulings in mass tort cases, none of their opinions
acknowledged this fact or labeled their uses of the writ as "supervisory" or "advisory." In
fact, ironically, while the Seventh Circuit in Rhone-Poulenc has adopted the boldest use to
date of mandamus in the mass tort context, it is unclear whether that circuit even
recognizes supervisory mandamus practice in general. See First Nat'l Bank of Waukesha
v. Warren, 796 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (7th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the supervisory
mandamus rule approved in La Buy "is defunct.... The dissenting Justices in La Buy
argued that mandamus should be reserved for truly extraordinary cases ....In the last 20
years this view has prevailed"). As Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper point out,
however, just three years after the Seventh Circuit announced the death of supervisory
mandamus, the Supreme Court ruled that mandamus could be used to correct an
erroneous order compelling counsel to represent in forma pauperis plaintiffs-clearly a
"supervisory" use of the writ. See 16 WRIGHTr ET AL., supra note 113, § 3934.1, at 571 &
n.1 (citing Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296,309 (1989)).
293. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 113, § 3933, at 527.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
expansion

and

development

of

existing

standards

[Vol. 80
governing

supervisory and advisory mandamus practice. The majority of the
courts of appeals have agreed upon a set of guidelines-the "Bauman
factors"-that are designed to limit the use of supervisory and
advisory mandamus to those extraordinary cases that truly merit it.
As articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Bauman v. United States Dist.
Court,294 the factors are:
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means,
such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires.
(2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way
not correctable on appeal ....

(3) The district court's order

is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. (4) The district
court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a
persistent disregard of the federal rules. (5) The district
court's order raises new and important problems, or issues

of law of first impression. 95
Two decades' worth of experience with the Bauman factors
indicates that when they are properly applied, they do a good job of
limiting interlocutory appeals and controlling the expansion of
supervisory and advisory mandamus. 29 6 Moreover, as the following
discussion demonstrates, in many ways the Bauman factors are
perfectly suited for application in the mass tort context 2 97 But all too
294. 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977).
295. Id. at 654-55 (citations omitted). In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the Bauman factors, and some other
circuits rely on the same or similar factors. E.g., In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1271 (11th
Cir. 1988) (adopting the Bauman factors); 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, § 3934.1, at
577-87 (citing other courts and jurisdictions that recognize the Bauman factors or a
derivation thereof). Ironically, given its more liberal approach to both mandamus review
in mass tort cases and Rule 23(f) analysis, the Seventh Circuit relies on a more restrictive,
traditional two-part test. To grant a writ of mandamus, the Seventh Circuit requires a
finding of irreparable harm, and a finding that the district judge's order "so far exceed[ed]
the proper bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered usurpative in
character." See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995).
In my view, the more flexible Bauman standard is superior to the Seventh
Circuit's traditional formulation. The Bauman standard recognizes irreparable harm and
district court error as factors to be considered; but unlike the traditional formulation, it
does not require that both factors exist in order to grant the writ. The Bauman standard is
also superior in that it recognizes that mandamus may be appropriate to address a novel
issue of law. In both respects, the Bauman standard is more consistent with the emerging
standards relied on by the courts of appeals in analyzing Rule 23(f) petitions. See supra
Part IV.B (analyzing Rule 23(f) case law).
296. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, § 3934.1, at 586-87. According to Wright,
Miller, and Cooper, "[t]he Bauman factors emphasize the special nature of the
extraordinary writs, and application of the factors often counsels refusal of relief." 16 id.
§ 3934.1, at 586.
297. See infra Parts IV.D.l.a-c.
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often appellate courts reviewing mandamus petitions in mass tort
cases fail to perform a thorough analysis of these guidelines or even
to acknowledge that they are in fact employing supervisory or
advisory uses of the writ.9 8 Instead, they attempt to control the
expansion of mandamus by stressing repeatedly its extraordinary
nature and by adopting a vague "I know it when I see it" standard
when issuing the writ. 99 Such a short-sighted approach places
appellate courts in a classic Catch-22: Their reluctance to utilize
supervisory and advisory mandamus and their failure to articulate
clear standards for its development ensure that the practice remains
more dangerous and uncontrolled than it needs to be."° Moreover,
this conservative approach guarantees that supervisory and advisory
mandamus practice remains a much less effective tool for
interlocutory review in mass tort cases than it could be.
A better approach is for courts to state clearly in their mandamus
opinions that they are relying on supervisory and advisory mandamus
practice. In doing so, courts should utilize the Bauman factors, or
similar guidelines, to articulate carefully reasoned justifications for a
decision to grant or deny a mandamus appeal in a particular mass tort
case. As these guidelines are consistently applied, a solid body of law
will develop that will help to define the contours and proper use of
supervisory and advisory mandamus as an interlocutory review device
for mass tort litigation.

298. See supra Parts III.B.2-3. In this respect, the approach of appellate courts
reviewing mass tort litigation is typical of the modem approach to mandamus generally.
See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, § 3934, at 566 (stating that appellate opinions
"often avoid the supervisory and advisory labels, but.., cumulatively show extraordinary
writ review in an active and almost flourishing state").
299. A case in point is In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997), in
which the Fifth Circuit used mandamus to reverse a bellwether trial plan. The majority
opinion never mentioned supervisory or advisory mandamus; it merely stressed that
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and then proceeded to grant the writ without
discussing any standards for the grant of mandamus. Id. at 1018-21. A concurring opinion
noted this deficiency and attempted to remedy it. IL at 1021 (Jones, J., specially
concurring) ("This court has a duty not only to encant the proper standard of review
applicable to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, but also to show why that remedy is
appropriate in the circumstances before us."). But the concurring opinion, too, attempted
to rely on the traditionally narrow conception of mandamus and failed to acknowledge
that this was in fact a supervisory use of the writ. Id. at 1021-22.
300. Cf Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967) (asserting that the failure to
provide an opinion explaining a grant of mandamus deprived district courts of the
necessary guidance or instruction regarding the proper practice in the future, and noting
that "[a] mandamus from the blue without rationale is tantamount to an abdication of the
very expository and supervisory functions of an appellate court").
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Courts applying a Bauman analysis in the mass tort context
might pay particular attention to the following factors in deciding
whether to grant mandamus. It is important to keep in mind that
these factors are simply guidelines that should be employed flexibly.
A proper analysis requires the careful balancing of these and perhaps
other factors, 301
and no one factor is likely to be dispositive in any
particular case.
a. Irreparable Harm
The first two Bauman factors essentially amount to a familiar
irreparable harm standard: The party seeking a writ of mandamus
has no other means of relief, and he or she will be damaged in a way
that is not correctable on appeal from final judgment.302 A careful
irreparable harm analysis is particularly important in the mass tort
context because so many pretrial orders effectively end the litigation,
with no opportunity for appellate review. In particular, a pretrial
ruling denying class certification, consolidation, or other aggregation
is often fatal to a mass tort plaintiff's case. Litigation in such cases is
often too expensive for plaintiffs to pursue in their individual
capacities-the classic "death knell" situation. 03
But the importance of the irreparable harm analysis is certainly
not limited to situations in which mass tort plaintiffs seek mandamus
review. Mass tort defendants often face a "reverse death knell"
situation. 304 In In re Rhone-Poulenc, for example, the court relied on
irreparable harm to a mass tort defendant as a justification for
granting a writ of mandamus. 30 5 The court held that because the
district court's trial plan would place enormous pressure on the
defendant to settle, the pretrial order would effectively end the
litigation with no opportunity for the defendants to seek appellate
review. 06
301. Appellate courts relying on the Bauman factors emphasize that these guidelines
are intended to be used flexibly, and that courts may take into account other factors as
well. E.g., Star Editorial, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 7 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1993)
("The guidelines are not susceptible to mechanical application, but are a useful analytic
framework regarding propriety of mandamus relief."); see also 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 113, § 3934.1, at 577 & nn.14-15 (stating that the Bauman factors should be balanced
against each other in a flexible fashion).
302. Cf. Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting
that the first two factors are "closely related").
303. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (describing the "death knell"
situation).
304. See supra note 276 (describing the "reverse death knell" situation).
305. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-99 (7th Cir. 1995).
306. Id. For additional discussions of In re Rhone-Poulenc, see supra Part III.B.3.
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I do not suggest that appellate courts should grant mandamus
review in every mass tort case in which a pretrial order may inflict
irreparable harm on one of the litigants, even when that harm is so
severe that it effectively signals the end of the litigation. On the
contrary, the trial court's bell should toll the deaths of many mass tort
cases before they ever reach the appellate stage, because either the
plaintiffs' claims or the defendants' proffered defenses are meritless.
Instead, I suggest that in most mass tort cases, a finding of
irreparable harm will be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
for mandamus review. In most cases when a district court's decision
does not signal the end of the litigation for one of the parties, courts
should be reluctant to grant mandamus review unless the other
factors discussed below indicate very strongly a need for such review.
But in a small number of cases when "the stakes are large and the risk
of a settlement or other disposition that does not reflect the merits of
the claim is substantial," 3 7 mandamus review may well be
appropriate. This is especially so if other factors also indicate a need
for such review.
b. Errors by the District Court
The third and fourth Bauman factors address error on the part of
the trial judge. They provide that supervisory mandamus may be
appropriate in some cases when a pretrial order is "clearly erroneous"
or an "oft-repeated error."3 ° The careful application of these factors
will assist appellate courts in using mandamus to shape the
development of the mass tort regime. For example, as procedural
innovations and novel legal theories continue to be developed and
refined at the trial level, appellate courts can rely on the Bauman
error factors to permit some of these innovations to go forward, while
rejecting others as improper expansions of existing legal doctrine.
Thus, when an appellate court wants to contract the boundaries in a
particular area where it believes that innovation has gone too far, it
can accomplish this goal by issuing a writ of mandamus based in part
on a finding that the trial judge's innovation was clearly erroneous.
On the other hand, if an appellate court believes that
experimentation with another innovation or novel theory should go
forward, it can permit this development by refusing to grant

307. Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
in such situations, an appeal under Rule 23(f) is appropriate).
308. Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654-55.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

mandamus in such cases. 319 It can base its decision in part on a
finding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous and must
therefore await appeal from final judgment. By utilizing this flexible
approach to the Bauman error factors, appellate courts can encourage
and contribute to the healthy development of the mass tort regime.
At the same time, such an approach will build a body of law that will
assist in developing the writ of mandamus into a suitable
interlocutory review device for mass tort cases.
c. New and Important Problems or Issues of Law of First Impression
The final Bauman factor instructs courts that mandamus review
may be appropriate when a district court's order raises "new and
important problems," or legal issues of first impression-the
"advisory" use of the writ of mandamus. 31 Relying on this factor, an
appellate court can use mandamus review to shape emerging issues of
procedural or substantive law in mass tort litigation. Because mass
tort cases tend to settle long before final judgment, many
fundamental issues in mass torts remain poorly developed at the
appellate level. Mandamus petitions raising such issues are ideal
candidates for a grant of review based on a finding that they raise
"new and important problems" or "issues of first impression. "311 On
the other hand, an appellate court can reject a mandamus petition on
an issue of less importance to the development of the mass tort
regime, based on a finding that it does not meet the final Bauman
guideline. In this way, appellate courts can employ the writ of
mandamus strategically to rule on the "big issues" in the developing
mass tort regime, while preserving the gatekeeping function of the
traditional writ.
2. Add a "Maturity" Factor
In addition to the elaboration of existing guidelines governing
supervisory and advisory mandamus, a second important step in
developing mandamus as a mass tort interlocutory review device is
the addition of a sixth factor. 12 This factor, one that is uniquely
309. In some cases, appellate courts may utilize the Bauman error factors to encourage,
or even compel, reluctant, overly conservative trial judges to use aggressive techniques to
resolve mass tort cases. The Sixth Circuit adopted this approach in the Dow Corning
litigation, granting a writ of mandamus based in part on a finding that the trial court had
erred in refusing to employ aggressive aggregation techniques. See infra note 318.
310. Id.at 655.
311. Cf Blair,181 F.3d at 835 (applying similar logic to appeals under Rule 23(0).
312. Cf United States v. Harper, 729 F.2d 1216, 1221-24 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that
the Bauman factors serve as the starting point in analysis rather than a rigid formula, and
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tailored to the mass tort context, calls for courts to take into account
the relative maturity of the mass tort at the time of the mandamus
petition.
When Frances McGovern first identified the "maturity" concept
in mass torts, he expressed the view (now widely adopted by mass tort
scholars and courts) that aggressive, innovative judicial techniques
could be particularly beneficial in resolving "mature" mass torts. 13
Professor McGovern describes a "mature mass tort" as one
where there has been full and complete discovery, multiple
jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs'
contentions. Typically at the mature stage, little or no new
evidence will be developed, significant appellate review of
any novel legal issues has been concluded, and at least one
full cycle of trial strategies has been exhausted.3 4
He proposes aggressive consolidation, claims resolution, and
settlement techniques to resolve mass torts that have reached this
advanced stage of development.31 5 "Maturity" has since become a
commonplace term among mass tort scholars and judges, who have
adopted the concept as a helpful way of thinking about certain issues
3 16
in mass torts.
A decade later, however, "maturity" remains an elusive, if useful,
concept. At what stage in the life of a particular mass tort should a
trial court employ aggressive aggregation and settlement techniques,
and at what stages are such techniques likely to result only in further
confusion of issues or unfairness to one or more of the litigants?
In fact, an underlying theme in many of the appellate decisions
discussed in this Article is the appellate courts' apparent concern that
some mass tort trial judges may be failing to take maturity into proper
account in managing mass tort litigation. Trial court decisions have
erred on both sides of the line. On the one hand, some overly
aggressive trial judges have applied aggregation and settlement
techniques to immature mass torts that, in the judgment of the courts

additional factors may be considered), cited in 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113,
§ 3934.1, at 577 n.15.
313. See Frances E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 659,688-64 (1989).
314. Id. at 659.
315. Id. at 690-94.
316. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.26 (1995) (noting
that" 'mature' mass torts like asbestos or Dalkon Shield may call for procedures that are
not appropriate for incipient mass tort cases, such as those involving injuries arising from
new products, chemical substances, or pharmaceuticals").
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of appeals, were not ready for the application of such techniques. 17
On the other hand, some trial judges handling mature mass tort cases
have appeared reluctant to use any sort of innovative procedures,
even in the face of clear signals from the appellate courts that they
31I
would approve the use of such techniques.
317. See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J.,
specially concurring) (reversing the trial court's proposed "bellwether trial" plan in light of
the immaturity of the mass tort action "in which the defendant's liability has not even
been tested, much yet firmly established"); id. (noting that "[tihe use of innovative judicial
techniques particularly to resolve immature mass tort actions has been disfavored"); see
also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing a class
certification order on the ground that "it is entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative
determination of [defendants'] liability ... to emerge from a decentralized process of
multiple trials"); id. at 1300 ("For this consensus or maturing of judgment the district
judge proposes to substitute a single trial before a single jury .... [which] will hold the fate
of an industry in the palm of its hand."); cf Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,74650 (5th Cir. 1996) (ruling on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
reversing a class certification order on the ground that the mass tort was too immature to
permit class certification). In both Rhone-Poulenc and Castano, the appellate courts
expressed particular concern that the trial courts had attempted to use aggressive
aggregation techniques on mass tort actions involving claims based on novel, largely
untested theories of substantive law. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 747-49; Rhone-Poulenc, 51
F.3d at 1300-01.
318. A case in point is the tug-of-war between Judge Denise Page Hood of the Eastern
District of Michigan and the Sixth Circuit regarding Judge Hood's refusal to employ
aggressive aggregation techniques as part of the Dow Coming bankruptcy proceeding.
See generally Alison Frankel, Dow Corning Goes for Broke, THE AMERICAN LAWYER,
Jan./Feb. 1996, at 78 (discussing the Dow Coming bankruptcy proceeding and appeals).
Shortly after the bankruptcy proceeding began, Dow Coming, its shareholders (Dow
Chemical and Coming Incorporated), and the other breast implant manufacturers moved
to transfer to Judge Hood's court all opt-out claims pending against them nationwidethat is, all claims that were not a part of the global settlement then pending in Alabama.
See iL at 79-80. By this time (mid-1995), the scientific and medical community had
reached a virtual consensus that breast implants did not cause the autoimmune diseases of
which the plaintiffs complained. Id. at 82. The manufacturers hoped that Judge Hood
would bring an end to the breast implant litigation once and for all by permitting a single
jury trial on the issue of causation. See id
Although the breast implant litigation seemed ripe for resolution by the use of
such aggressive techniques, Judge Hood refused to transfer the opt-out claims against the
nondebtor defendants, holding that she did not have jurisdiction under the bankruptcy
laws over those claims. In re Dow Corning Corp., 187 B.R. 919, 932 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
The manufacturers appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In re
Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 498 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit adopted a broad
interpretation of the bankruptcy code's transfer provisions, and it discussed with approval
the Fourth Circuit's decision upholding the aggressive aggregation techniques adopted by
the district court in the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy. See id. at 496 (citing A.H. Robins Co.
v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986)). The Sixth Circuit clearly stated that it was
inviting, and indeed encouraging, Judge Hood to wield the bankruptcy code's aggregation
provisions aggressively in order to bring an end to the entire breast implant litigation. See
id. at 495-97.
On remand, however, Judge Hood declined a second time to exercise jurisdiction
over the claims against the nondebtor defendants. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 1996 WL
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Experience indicates, then, that mandamus review will be most
important in cases in which there is this sort of disconnect at the trial
level between the judicial technique to be applied, and the maturity of
the mass tort in question. Appellate courts can gauge the importance
of mandamus review in a particular case by examining whether a
district court has applied appropriate techniques, given the relative
maturity of the mass tort at the time of the petition. In this way,
appellate courts can use the writ of mandamus to address both of the
problems described above: They can grant mandamus review to
control overly aggressive trial court attempts to resolve immature
mass torts, or to compel trial judges to take more aggressive action to
resolve mature mass torts.
The addition of a maturity factor to the existing mandamus
guidelines is yet another means to develop mandamus into a useful
tool for mass tort interlocutory review. By using the writ of
mandamus to apply and develop the maturity concept in mass tort
litigation, appellate courts will be providing much-needed guidance to
the trial courts on the proper application of aggressive aggregation
and settlement techniques in a variety of mass tort settings. At the
same time, the addition of this factor will assist appellate courts in
limiting the reach of mandamus to appropriate cases.
3. Adopt a "Certiorari" Approach to Mandamus Review
Finally, in developing mandamus for use in mass tort cases,
appellate courts can employ a third strategy: To the extent possible,
they should restrict mandamus review to cases where it is clearly
needed to establish or clarify important legal rules governing the mass
tort regime as a whole. As Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper
have noted:
511646, at 3-4 (E.D. Mich. July, 30 1996). The Sixth Circuit responded swiftly. In a
mandamus opinion that was sharply critical of Judge Hood, it ordered the transfer of all
claims pending against Dow Corning's shareholders. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 113
F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 1997). But it declined, without explanation, to order the transfer of
claims pending against other nondebtor defendants, thus ending the manufacturers' hopes
of using Dow Coming's bankruptcy to bring a quick end to the entire breast implant
litigation. See id.
319. At least one court has already utilized the maturity concept to assist it in ruling on
the propriety of mandamus review. In the pedicle screw MDL, the Third Circuit denied
mandamus petitions filed by the defendants, in part on the ground that the litigation was
"fully mature and ready for remand," and the issues raised by the defendants could be
better addressed by individual trial courts in the transferor districts. See In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014 (3d Cir. Nov. 10,1997), cited in Plaintiffs in
Pedicle Screw MDL Defeat Mandamus Motion, MEDICAIJLEGAL ASPECTS OF BREAST
IMPLANTS, November 1997, at WL 5 No. 12 MLABI 1.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

One of the special advantages of review by extraordinary
writ is that it is possible to respond to a perceived need to
provide occasional appellate guidance on matters that often
elude ordinary appeal, without establishing rules of
appealability that bring a flood of less important appeals in
their wake.32 °
Appellate courts can accomplish these goals by "warning that
issuance of a writ to settle an important question in a particular case
does not mean that orders of the same descriptive character will be
suitable for writ review in the future." 321 In other words, once an
appellate court establishes guidelines regarding an important legal
issue, it need not grant mandamus review every time a litigant claims
that a trial judge incorrectly interpreted or applied those guidelines.
Instead, in the mass tort context, appellate courts should
approach petitions for mandamus review much as the Supreme Court
approaches petitions for a writ of certiorari.2
For example, an
appellate court could, in the first instance, grant mandamus review on
a particular issue in order to establish the general contours or
guidelines that trial courts should follow. The appellate court might
then choose to deny subsequent mandamus petitions (or other
requests for interlocutory review) on that issue for a period of time, in
order to permit further trial court experimentation and fleshing out of
those guidelines. Finally, the court could grant interlocutory review
again, when necessary, to provide further guidance and to incorporate
into existing guidelines the knowledge and experience gained by
subsequent trial court experimentation.

320. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 113, § 3934.1, at 572.
321. Id. In Schlagenhaufv. Holder,379 U.S. 104 (1964), the Supreme Court expressed
a similar view. In granting a writ of mandamus to overturn a district court order requiring
the physical and mental examination of a defendant, the Court cautioned that once its
opinion had established guidelines for the lower courts, litigants should not assume that
mandamus would be an appropriate remedy for "any future allegation that the District
Court was in error in applying these guidelines ....The writ of mandamus is not to be
used when 'the most that could be claimed is that the district courts have erred in ruling on
matters within their jurisdiction.'" Id.at 112 (quoting Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513,
520 (1956)).
322. In promulgating Rule 23(f), the Advisory Committee also urged the appellate
courts to adopt a "certiorari" approach. The Advisory Committee's note accompanying
Rule 23(f) explains that under the new rule, "[tihe court of appeals is given unfettered
discretion whether to permit the appeal, akin to the discretion exercised by the Supreme
Court in acting on a petition for certiorari.... Permission to appeal may be granted or
denied on the basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note.
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CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have explored the phenomenon of procedural
uncoupling and its dramatic impact on the development of the
emerging mass tort regime. I have argued that the widening gap
between equity-oriented trial procedures and common law-oriented
appellate procedures has resulted in a growing power imbalance
between mass tort trial judges and the appellate courts. In addition, I
have examined the increasing willingness of appellate courts to grant
interlocutory review in mass tort cases in response to this problemevidence of a growing realization among appellate courts that if their
rulings are to have a real impact on the development of the mass tort
regime, they can no longer cling to the common law final judgment
rule. These appellate decisions demonstrate the gradual evolution of
appellate procedure from a first-generation common law-based
model to a third-generation equity-based model, as appellate courts
search for ways to become active participants in shaping the
substantive and procedural rules governing the emerging mass tort
regime.
Finally, I have argued that the common law writ of mandamus is
the ideal candidate for development as a third-generation, equityoriented mass tort interlocutory review device. The body of law
regarding the use of mandamus in mass tort cases indicates a growing
appellate awareness of mandamus's powerful potential for
application in mass tort cases, as well as its powerful potential for
misuse. Thus far, however, appellate courts' ad hoc attempts to strike
a balance between the flexibility and gatekeeping functions of
mandamus have been inadequate, and the guidelines governing the
use of mandamus in the mass tort context remain severely
underdeveloped as a result. The strategies that I have identified in
this Article invite courts to engage in a more mature, principled
review of mandamus petitions, and thus represent a far superior
method of developing mandamus into a suitable interlocutory review
device for mass torts.
Professor Moore assessed the proper role of the common law
writ of mandamus as follows: "[I]f the [final judgment] line is to be
held, the genial current of mandamus cannot be frozen. Review by
mandamus should indeed be restricted to the exceptional, unusual
case, but such cases do arise, and the courts should be alert to
respond to them. 1132 Mass tort litigation epitomizes the "exceptional
323. 9 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
ed. 1996).

110.26, at 32 (2d
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case" that requires a flexible device for heightened interlocutory
appellate review. If it is carefully developed through the use of the
strategies discussed in this Article, the common law writ of
mandamus is uniquely qualified to fill that role.

